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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,

)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

)
vs.

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 45179

)

)
STATE OF IDAHO,

DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. CV 2013-390

)
)
)
)
)

Respondent,

*********************************
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

*********************************
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

*********************************
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
DISTRICT JUDGE

**********************************

Lawrence Wasden
Attention: Appellate Unit
700 West Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83720

Eric D. Fredericksen
State Appellate Public Defender
322 E Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, ID 83702
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5tll JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
·· '.0n:7/10l201703:59PM ·.':·:
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
q.ERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: Av

I n t he Supreme Court of the State of Idano
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO.

)

)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant.
\'.

STATE OF IDAHO.

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL

)

Supreme Court D,1cket No. 45l79-2017

)

Cassia County No. CV-2013-390

)

)

Respondent.

)

A Clerk's Record

\Vas

tiled with this Court in prior appeal No. 41995. Arellann

1·.

State

(Cassia County No. CV-2013-390). Therefore.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this Record on Appeal shall be AUG\ttENTED to include

the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 41995, Arellano r. Sra1e (Cassia County No. CV-2013390).
IT FURTHER (S ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and tilt: a
CLERK ·s RECORD with this Court which shall contain the documents re4ucsted in this ~oticc of
Appeal together with a copy or this Order, but shall not duplicate any d<.1cument included in the
Clerk·s Record filed in prior appeal No. 41995. The CLERK"S RECORD shall be filed \Vith this
Court by September 5, 201]/
DATED this

cc;

~ a y of July. 2017.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Michael R. Crabtree
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User: ALEJANDRA

Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date
5/3/2013

Judge
New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition

Michael R Crabtree

Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel

Michael R Crabtree

Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Michael R Crabtree
Fees (Prisoner}
5/6/2013

Order GRANTING Motion for Appointment of Counsel - PUBLIC
DEFENDER

Michael R Crabtree

5/21/2013

Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Michael R Crabtree

6/3/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 09/16/2013 01 :30 PM}

Michael R Crabtree

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/30/2013 09:00 AM} Motions

Michael R Crabtree

Motion to Vacate Trial and Motion to Extend Deadline and Schedule for
filing of Dispositive Motions

Michael R Crabtree

Notice of Hearing - Motion to Vacate Trial and Motion to Extend Deadline
and Schedule for filing of Dispositive Motions

Michael R Crabtree

9/16/2013

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 09/16/2013 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Vacated

Michael R Crabtree

9/30/2013

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 9/30/2013
Time: 10:32 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Timothy Schneider
Party: State of Idaho - Douglas Abenroth

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 09/30/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing
Held Motion to Vacate Trial and Motion to Extend Deadline and Schedule
for filing of Dispositive Motions

Michael R Crabtree

9/13/2013

Order to vacate trial and order to extend deadline and schedule for filing of Michael R Crabtree
dispositive motions
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/14/2014 01 :30 PM)

Michael R Crabtree

Notice of Hearing - Court Trial

Michael R Crabtree

State's Motion for Dismissal or Alternatively, Motion for Summary
Disposition

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Douglas G. Abenroth

Michael R Crabtree

Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition

Michael R Crabtree

11/15/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/30/2013 01:30 PM} State's Motion for
Dismissal or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition

Michael R Crabtree

12/2/2013

Notice of Conflict

Michael R Crabtree

12/6/2013

Continued (Motion 01/13/2014 09:00 AM) State's Motion for Dismissal or Michael R Crabtree
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition

11/14/2013

Stipulation to Continue

Michael R Crabtree
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User: ALEJANDRA

Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date

Judge

12/6/2013

Order Allowing Additional Time to File Reply Brief and to Continue Hearing Michael R Crabtree

12i20/2013

Stipulation to Continue

Michael R Crabtree

12/23/2013

Order Allowing Additional Time to File Reply Brief

Michael R Crabtree

Continued (Motion 01/27/2014 09:30 AM) State's Motion for Dismissal or Michael R Crabtree
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition
12/24/2013

Stipulation to Continue

Michael R Crabtree

Order Allowing Additional Time to File Reply Breif and to Continue Hearing Michael R Crabtree
Motion for Appointment of Substitute Counsel

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Juan Manuel Arellano

Michael R Crabtree

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Appointment of Substitute
Counsel

Michael R Crabtree

Clerk's Certificate Of Service

Michael R Crabtree

1/13/2014

Motion to Permit Attorney to Withdraw

Michael R Crabtree

1/14/2014

Order DENYING the Petitioner's Motion to Permit Attorney to Withdraw

Michael R Crabtree

1/15/2014

Continued (Court Trial 02/24/2014 09:00 AM)

Michael R Crabtree

1/9/2014

Continued (Motion 02/14/2014 11 :00 AM) State's Motion for Dismissal or Michael R Crabtree
Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition
Stipulation to Continue

Michael R Crabtree

Order Extending Time to File Brief & to Continue Hearings

Michael R Crabtree

2/5/2014

Objection to Motion for Summary Disposition

Michael R Crabtree

2/11/2014

Stipulation to Vacate Hearing (Motion for Summary Disposition)

Michael R Crabtree

1/16/2014

Notice of Hearing Vacated

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/14/2014 11 :00 AM: Hearing
Vacated State's Motion for Dismissal or Alternatively, Motion for Summary
Disposition
2/12/2014

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition

Michael R Crabtree

2/18/2014

Order GRANTING the State's Motion for Summary Disposition

Michael R Crabtree

Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 02/24/2014 09:00 AM:
Hearing Vacated

Michael R Crabtree

Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho, Defendant; Arellano, Juan
Manuel, Subject. Filing date: 2/18/2014

Michael R Crabtree

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Counsel

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Juan Manuel Arellano

Michael R Crabtree

Motion for Substitute Counsel

Michael R Crabtree

Notice of Appeal

Michael R Crabtree

Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel

Michael R Crabtree

2/21/2014

3/19/2014

Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Michael R Crabtree
Fees (Prisoner)
3/20/2014

Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counsel (SAPD)

Michael R Crabtree
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Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date

Judge

5/29/2015

2015 Opinion No. 30
Filed: May 27, 2015
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Michael R Crabtree

6/22/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 08/21/2015 01:30 PM}

Michael R Crabtree

Notice of Hearing - Court Trial

Michael R Crabtree

Order Regarding Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing

Michael R Crabtree

Order Re-Appointing Public Defender

Michael R Crabtree

Motion to Permit Attorney to Withdraw

Michael R Crabtree

Order Permitting Attorney to Withdraw and Appointing Conflict Public
Defender (David Haley}

Michael R Crabtree

Remittitur

Michael R Crabtree

7/7/2015

Subpoena Returned**Kent Jensen

Michael R Crabtree

8/20/2015

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

8/21/2015

Notice of Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 08/21/2015 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Vacated
Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender- Michael P. Tribe

8/26/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 10/15/2015 01:30 PM}

Michael R Crabtree

8/27/2015

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order

John K Butler

9/3/2015

Petitioner's Disclosure of Witnesses

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

6/24/2015

Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees

Michael R Crabtree

Order For Payment of Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

9/11/2015

Court Trial Witness List (State)

Michael R Crabtree

9/16/2015

Motion to Continue
Continued (Court Trial 01/22/2016 09:00 AM}

Michael R Crabtree

Order Continuing Evidentiary Hearing

Michael R Crabtree

Motion For Payment Of Attorney Fees's
Affidavit Of Michael P. Tribe For Payment Of Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment of Attorney's Fees
Subpoena Returned ** Kent Jensen
Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

9/4/2015

9/30/2015
10/2/2015

10/22/2015
11/4/2015
11/5/2015

12/3/2015

Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees

Order for Payment of Attorney Fees
Motion for Preparation of Trancsript
Motion for Transport

12/4/2015

Order for Transport
Order for Preparation of Transcript

12/10/2015

Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for payment of Attorney Fees

12/11/2015

Order for Payment of Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree
John K Butler
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
GR Bevan
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Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date
1/8/2016

Judge
Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for payment of Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

Ex Parte Motion to Disclose Presentence Investigation

Michael R Crabtree

Order for payment of Attorney fees

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/19/2016 04:15 PM)

Michael R Crabtree

1/11/2016

Transcript Filed
Sentencing (held 04/08/2011 in CR 2010-4251)

Michael R Crabtree

1/14/2016

Stipulated Motion to continue Evidentiary Hearing

Michael R Crabtree

1/19/2016

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 1/19/2016
Time: 4: 13 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Minutes Clerk: Theresa Forthun
Tape Number:
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 01/22/2016 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held
Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 02/29/2016 01:30 PM)

Michael R Crabtree

Order Continuing Evidentiary Hearing

Michael R Crabtree

Order Ailowig Disclosure of Presentence Investigation

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/19/2016 04:15 PM: Hearing
Held Motion to Disclose Presentence Investigation

Michael R Crabtree

Motion for Payment of Attorney Fees
Affidavit of Michael P. Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

2/2/2016

Order for Payment of Attorney Fees

2/5/2016
2/10/2016

Subpoena Returned-Kent Jensen

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

Respondent's Exhibit List

Michael R Crabtree

Motion for Transport
Order for Transport

Michael R Crabtree

2/1/2016

2/11/2016
2/17/2016

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/23/2016 03:00 PM) Motion for Appointment Michael R Crabtree
of New Attorney for Petitioner
Michael R Crabtree
Notice of Hearing
Motion for Appointment of New Attorney for Petitioner

2/23/2016

Michael R Crabtree

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to W/Draw
Hearing date: 2/23/2016
Time: 3: 13 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Roxanne Patchell
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
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Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Judge

Date
2/23/2016
2/29/2016

3/1/2016
3/2/2016

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/23/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Held Motion for Appointment of New Attorney for Petitioner
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 2/29/2016
Time: 1:33 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 02/29/2016 01 :30 PM: Hearing
Held
Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender - STEVEN R. MCRAE
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 03/24/2016 09:00 AM)

Notice of Hearing - Scheduling Conference
State's Response to Request for Discovery
Ex-Parte Motion for Payment
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

3/3/2016
3/7/2016
3/9/2016
3/17/2016

4/1/2016

Order for Payment
Motion for Payment of Attorney's Fees
Affidavit of Michael P Tribe for Payment of Attorney Fees
Order for Payment of Attorney Fees
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 03/24/2016 09:00
AM: Hearing Vacated
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 05/03/2016 09:00 AM)
Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 05/09/2016 02:00 PM)
Notice of Hearing Vacated and Reset
Continued (Evidentiary 06/03/2016 02:00 PM)

4/11/2016

Notice of Hearing
Affidavit Of Steven R. McRae
Ex Parte Motion For Payment

4/12/2016
4/14/2016

Order For Payment
Subpoena Returned**Kent Jensen, new address 304 W 24th Burley

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Randy Stoker
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
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Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Judge

Date
5/3/2016

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 5/3/2016
Time: 9:15 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

Michael R Crabtree

5/4/2016

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 05/03/2016 09:00 AM: Michael R Crabtree
Hearing Held
Michael R Crabtree
Order to transport

5/5/2016

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

5/31/2016

Subpoena Returned •• Kent Jensen

Michael R Crabtree

6/3/2016

Continued (Evidentiary 08/19/2016 09:00 AM)

Michael R Crabtree

(Petitioner's) Exhibit List

Michael R Crabtree

Notice of Hearing Vacated and Reset

Michael R Crabtree

Minute Entry

Michael R Crabtree

Exparte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Subpoena Returned Kent Jensen

Michael R Crabtree

Continued (Evidentiary 09/29/2016 09:00 AM)

Michael R Crabtree

6/7/2016
6/8/2016

Notice of Hearing Vacated and Reset

Michael R Crabtree

7/5/2016

Order to Transport

Michael R Crabtree

7/7/2016

Affidavit of Steven McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Ex-Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

7/8/2016

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

7/14/2016

Subpoena Returned**Kent Jensen

Michael R Crabtree

8/2/2016

First State's Supplemental Discovery Response

Michael R Crabtree

(State's) Exhibit List

Michael R Crabtree

(State's) Witness List

Michael R Crabtree

EX parte Motion for payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R Mcrae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

9/6/2016

Motion to transport

Michael R Crabtree

9/7/2016

Order to Transport

Michael R Crabtree

9/9/2016

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

8/9/2016
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Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date
9/21/2016

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 9/21/2016
Time: 3:36 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on 09/29/2016 09:00 AM:
Continued

Michael R Crabtree

9/28/2016

Order to Transport

Michael R Crabtree

10/6/2016

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 12/05/2016 09:00 AM)

Michael R Crabtree

Notice of Hearing - Court Trial
Continued (Court Trial 01/13/2017 09:00 AM)
Notice Vacating and Resetting Of Evidentiary Hearing
Subpoena Retumed**Kent Jensen
Ex Parte Motion for Payment
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae
Order for Payment
Subpoena Returned - Kent Jensen
Motion to Transport
Order to Transport
Ex Parte Motion for Payment
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae
Order for Payment
Second State's Supplemental Discovery Response
Ex Parte Motion for Payment
Affidavit of Steven R. McRae
Order for Payment
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 1/13/2017
Time: 9:01 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

10ll/2016
10/19/2016
10/27/2016
11ll/2016
11/8/2016
11/22/2016
11/28/2016
12n/2016

1/6/2017
1/10/2017
1/11/2017
1/13/2017

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree
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Case: CV-2013-0000390 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree

Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Post Conviction Relief
Date
1/13/2017

Judge
Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 01/13/2017 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Preparation of Transcript

Michael R Crabtree

2/7/2017

Transcript Filed - Hearing held on 01/13/2017

Michael R Crabtree

2/8/2017

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

3/8/2017

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

3/16/2017

Petitioner's Post Trial Brief

Michael R Crabtree

4/10/2017

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

4/18/2017

Order for Payment
Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief

4/20/2017

Order for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief

Jonathan Brody

4/21/2017

Stipulation for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief

Michael R Crabtree

4/24/2017

Order for Extension of Time to File Respondent's Brief

Michael R Crabtree

4/26/2017

Repondent's Post-Trial Brief

Michael R Crabtree

4/28/2017

Petitioner's Reply Post-Trial Brief

5/3/2017

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law

Michael R Crabtree

Judgment
Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho, Defendant; Arellano, Juan
Manuel, Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/18/2017

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree

6/6/2017

Notice of Appeal
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender
Notice and Order For Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender

6/8/2017

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R Crabtree
Randy Stoker
Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment
Order Augmenting Appeal
Ex Parte Motion For Payment

John K Butler
Michael R Crabtree

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R Crabtree

Order for Payment

Michael R Crabtree

3/7/2017

4/11/2017

5/8/2017

5/18/2017

6/5/2017

7/10/2017
7/11/2017

Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree
Michael R Crabtree

Michael R Crabtree
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 41995
L.~,

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
_______________

j

···eJL

-

--

J.

) 2015 Opinion No. 30
)
) Filed: May 27, 2015
)
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
)
)
)
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia
County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge.
Judgment of the district court summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction
relief, affirmed in part, vacated in part and case remanded.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge
Juan Manuel Arellano appeals from the judgment of the district court summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Underlying this post-conviction relief action, Arellano entered a guilty plea to the first
de2ree murder of his wife, except that he entered an Alfori plea to the element of malice
aforethought, Idaho Code § 18-4001, and to the element of premeditation, I.C. § l 8-4003(a).

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
l
11

This Court affirmed his judgment of conviction and sentence in State v. Arellano, Docket No.
38880 (Ct. App. May 7, 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Arellano then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief with sixty-four assertions.
He also moved the district court to appoint counsel, and counsel was appointed for him.
Subsequently, the State moved the court to summarily dismiss the petition, and Arellano filed an
objection to the motion for summary dismissal.

The district court then issued an order

summarily dismissing the petition. In that order, the court consolidated the sixty-four assertions
into fourteen claims of ineffective assistance of defense counsel and one claim of an insufficient
factual basis to support the Alford plea. In particular, the district court consolidated some of the
assertions into what the court characterized as a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance because counsel "told Mr. Arellano that evidence of the victim's intentions and his
mental state was not relevant." Arellano appeals, challenging the summary dismissal of this
ineffective assistance of defense counsel claim.

II.
ANALYSIS

On appeal, Arellano argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing what the
court characterized as a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because
counsel "told Mr. Arellano that evidence of the victim's intentions and his mental state was not
relevant." The district court dismissed this claim after finding that the claim was bare and
conclusory, that Arellano did not provide admissible evidence of deficient performance, and that
Arellano did not provide admissible evidence of prejudice.
Idaho Code section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
Summary dismissal of a petition pursuant to LC. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A claim for post-conviction relief

~ill be subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima
facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden
of proof. DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary
dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material
fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief.

If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Goodwin v. State,
2
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138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). Summary dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the State does not controvert the
petitioner's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of
law.

Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v.

Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).
Because this appeal involves an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we note that a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction
procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P .2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the
attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316,
900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of
showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Where, as here, the petitioner
was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the petitioner must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d
629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006). This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or
strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions
are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).
In his pro se petition, Arellano made several assertions concerning his mental state in
killing his wife:
29.
Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with
violence against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because
of the blind rage upon seeing her come back into the bar after her lover had
escorted her out.
30.
A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was
lacking on all the assault charges as he was under the influence of two drugs and
the culmination of emotions that his wife intentionally provoked.

3
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5 l.
No one knows wh[at] petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun and
walked out onto the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his emotions
overwhelmed him, and wanted to rant and rave.
52.
Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of
his passion as he was attempting to scare her. He never intended to kill her, but
the rage within was so overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by
the acts of others.
54.
Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with a
weapon in the heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally
came back into the bar.
Arellano also asserted that defense counsel provided deficient performance and prejudiced him:
53.
Under the professional norms counsel's assistance amounted to
incompetence. Counsel failed entirely in his representation.
55.
Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
56.
Petitioner asserts that there exist[s] a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.
57.
Counsel's failures prejudice[d] petitioner and ifhe would have fulfilled his
obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by
information.
58.
Petitioner advised his attorney [ot] his version of the facts surrounding the
death of his wife. Yet counsel insisted that some of these facts were irrelevant,
and that if he went to trial he would be found guilty. As a result of counsel
refusing to participate in petitioner's defense he entered a guilty plea.
This Court interprets assertion 58, based on the other relevant assertions listed in the
petition, to aver that Arellano informed defense counsel about his mental state when he killed his
wife and that defense counsel informed him that facts concerning his mental state were
irrelevant. This interpretation is bolstered by Arellano's objection to the motion for summary
dismissal, in which counsel explained that Arellano "avers that his [defense] counsel advised him
that his mental state at the time of the alleged incident was not relevant to the case." This
interpretation is also consistent with the district court's characterization of the claim, in which it
explained that '"Arellano contends that [defense counsel] told him that evidence of the victim's
intentions and his mental state ... was not relevant."
However, unlike the district court, we are persuaded that the claim is not bare and
conclusory, and we are also persuaded that there is admissible evidence supporting the claim.

4
14

Arellano' s pro se claim is not artfully pied, yet the assertions listed above do add up to a claim
asserting that defense counsel provided deficient performance by advising him that facts
concerning Arellano's mental state when he killed his wife were irrelevant. Taking the other
factual assertions offered by Arellano as true about the circumstances leading up to his wife's
death, Arellano's mental state was relevant, as Arellano explained that he was in "a blind rage"
after seeing his wife return to the bar and that his rage was "overwhelming." Indeed, evidence
challenging the premeditation element of first degree murder might lead a jury to convict of the
lesser charge of second degree murder, LC. § l 8-4003(a) and (g), and the unlawful killing of a
human being in the heat of passion is voluntary manslaughter, not murder, LC. § 18-4006.
Therefore, Arellano' s assertions support a prima facie case of deficient performance by defense
counsel when, as Arellano alleges, counsel insisted that facts concerning Arellano' s mental state
when Arellano killed his wife were irrelevant.
Arellano's assertions also set forth a prima facie case of prejudice. Beyond claiming that
he would not have pied guilty and insisted on going to trial, Arellano asserted that he pied guilty
··[a]s a result of counsel refusing to participate in [his] defense." These assertions compliment
the fact that Arellano entered an Alford plea by which he refused to admit to the elements of
malice aforethought and premeditation--elements that separate voluntary manslaughter from
murder and separate second degree murder from first degree murder respectively.

Taken

together, Arellano has presented prima facie evidence of a reasonable probability that he would
not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, but for defense counsel's alleged
deficient performance.
Although the district court also stated that Arellano did not "provide[] admissible
evidence," this is not so. Arellano's assertions concerning his mental state, what he told defense
counsel, and what counsel told him were within his personal knowledge; these assertions were
set forth in a verified petition, in which Arellano swore that "all statements" in his petition were
"true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief."

See I.C. § l 9-4902(a)

(requiring "[f]acts within the personal knowledge of the [petitioner] ... be sworn to affirmatively
as true and correct.''); LC. § 19-4903 (similarly requiring facts within the petition based upon
personal knowledge to be verified, as provided in LC. § 19-4902).

The district court, in

considering whether to gfflnt the State's motion for summary dismissal, must consider ''the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
5
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together with any affidavits submitted." LC.§ l9-4906(c). Therefore, for purposes of summary
dismissal, a petitioner's assertions in a petition based upon personal knowledge and properly
verified are admissible evidence and must be accounted for in deciding whether to grant
summary dismissal. Here, Arellano's assertions were admissible evidence.
In summary, Arellano's claim, as characterized by the district court, was not bare and
conclusory, and the claim did allege a prima facie case of deficient performance and prejudice.
The claim was backed by assertions that were admissible evidence for the district court to
consider in deciding whether to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal. Hence, the
State was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.2

Accordingly, we vacate

that portion of the judgment summarily dismissing this claim. As to all other claims alleged in
Arellano's petition for post-conviction relief, the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge LANSING and Judge ORATTON CONCUR

We do not express an opinion on whether Arellano's cla~ ~ill pr~vail in the di~ct
court following an evidentiary hearing. Rather, our scope of review 1s ltm1ted to ascertammg
whether the district court properly summarily dismissed the claim.

2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,

Case No. CV-2013-390

Petitioner,

ORDER REGARDING POSTCONVICTION EVIDENTIARY
HEARING

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The Petitioner Juan Manuel Arellano (hereafter "Mr. Arellano'') entered an Alford plea of
guilty to the offense of murder in the first degree with a sentence enhancement for the use of a
firearm in Cassia County case CR-2010-4251. On May 3, 2013, Mr. Arellano filed the Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief (hereafter "Petition") in this case. The State filed a Motion for
Dismissal Pursuant to Section 19-4906(b) or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Disposition
Pursuant to Section 19-4906(c) (hereafter ''motion for summary disposition"). On February 18,
2014, the court entered an order granting the State's motion for summary disposition and
dismissed Mr. Arellano's Petition in its entirety.
Mr. Arellano filed an appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals'affirmed this court's order
granting the State's motion for summary disposition in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the
case for further proceedings. See Arellano v. State, No. 41995, 2015 WL 2457811 (Idaho. Ct.

ORDER REGARDING POST-CONVICTION EVlDENTIARY HEARING
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App. May 27, 2015). In the opinion on appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals quoted the following
paragraphs from Mr. Arellano's Petition:
29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with violence
against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because of the blind rage
upon seeing her come back into the bar after her lover had escorted her out.
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was lacking on
all the assault charges as he was under the influence of two drugs and the culmination of
emotions that his wife intentionally provoked.

51. No one knows wh[at] petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun and walked out
onto the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his emotions overwhelmed him. and
wanted to rant and rave.
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of his passion
as he was attempting to scare her. He never intended to kill her, but the rage within was
so overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by the acts of others.
53. Under the professional norms counsel's assistance amounted to incompetence.
Counsel failed entirely in his representation.
54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with a weapon in the
heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally came back into the
bar.
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not functioning as the
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist[s] a reasonable probability that but for counsel's
representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.
57. Counsel's failures prejudice[d] petitioner and if he would have fulfilled his
obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by
information.
58. Petitioner advised his attorney [of] his version of the facts surrounding the death of
his wife. Yet counsel insisted that some of these facts were irrelevant, and that if he went
to trial he would be found guilty. As a result of counsel refusing to participate in
petitioner's defense he entered a guilty plea.
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CV-2013-390

Page 2

18

The foregoing paragraphs from the Petition set forth the only claim that remains
following the appeal. This case is currently set for an LC. § 19-4907 evidentiary hearing
regarding this claim on August 21. 2015. Since the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of all of Mr. Arellano's other post-conviction claims, the court considers evidence
regarding the dismissed post-conviction claims to be irrelevant and inadmissible pursuant to
I.R.E. 401 and 402.
.J

---~---~-

It is so ORDERED this 2 2 day of June, 2015. .

/

/

~~~
MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge

ORDER REGARDING POST-CONVICTION EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CV-2013-390

Page 3

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of June, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
1.

Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney
1459 Overland Avenue
P.O. Box7
Burley, ID 83318

v / e-mail - dnoriyuki@cassiacounty.org

2.

Cassia County Public Defender
P.O. Box 188
Burley, ID 83318

v /e-mail - mspeers@cassiacounty.org
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT THE 51" JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY CASSIACOUNTY,IDAHO
On: 8/27/2015 02:35 PM

'

JOSEPH W. LARSEN

CLERK OF THE Dl~ICT COURT

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO
Plaintiff,

vs
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CV-2013-0000390 D

Flied~)

SCHEDULING ORDER,
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING
AND INITIAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER
Presiding Judge: Michael R. Crabtree

Defendant.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40. unless the parties stipulate otherwise using the
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning document accompanying this Order, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:

1. TRIAL: This case is set for COURT TRIAL as follows:
Court Trial: Thursday, October 15, 2015, Time: 01:30 PM

A total of Yz day has been reserved.
2. DEADLINES WILL BE ENFORCED AT COURT'S DISCRETION: The deadlines set

forth in this Order are for the benefit of the Court in managing this case, and they will be enforced
at the Court's discretion. Any party seeking to alter any deadline shall file a motion and notice of
hearing.
3. AL TERNATE JUDGES: Notice is given that the presiding judge intends to utilize the

provisions of I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(G). An alternate judge may be assigned to preside at trial or at any
other hearing or proceeding in the case. The panel of alternate judges consists of the following
judges who otherwise have not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan, Brody, Butler, Elgee,
Hurlbutt, McDermott, Schroeder, Stoker, Wildman and Williamson.
21
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4. DEADLINE FOR PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All non-dispositive pre-trial motions must

be filed and scheduled to be heard not less than fourteen (14) days before trial. Exceptions will be
granted infrequently, and only when justice so requires.
5. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION:

a. Motions for summary disposition must be filed and served so as to be heard no later
than thirty (30) days before trial.
b. The party moving for summary disposition shall prepare as separate documents: (a)
motion, (b) legal memorandum containing a statement of reasons in support of the
motion, and (c) a concise statement of the material facts. Each statement of a fact shall
include a reference to the particular place in the record which supports that fact. The
legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the elements
of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
c. The party opposing a motion for summary disposition shall prepare as separate
documents: (a) legal memorandum containing a statement of reasons in opposition to
the motion, and (b) a concise statement of the facts which are genuine issues of
material fact and/or which are material facts omitted from the moving party's
statement of facts. Each statement of a fact must be supported by admissible evidence
and shall include a reference to the place in the record which supports that fact. The
legal memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the elements
of any claim or defense relevant to the motion.
d. The schedule for service of briefs and affidavits set forth in LR.C.P. 56(c) is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1.

The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least thirty-five
(35) days before the time fixed for the hearing.
22
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u. The adverse party shall serve an answering brief and opposing affidavits, if
any, at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of the hearing.

iii. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less than fourteen
(14) days before the date of the hearing.

e. The hearing on a motion for summary disposition will be set AFTER the moving
party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and statement of facts. The
hearing date can then be obtained from the judge's court clerk. This pertains to all
motions for summary disposition and motions for partial summary disposition.
6. MOTION FILING AND HEARINGS: All motions must be filed and served at least
fourteen (14) days prior to hearing. Scheduling of hearings will be through Deputy Clerk Tara

Gunderson ((208) 878-7152). Hearings on motions (except motions for summary disposition or
hearings at which testimony is to be offered) may be conducted by telephone conference call
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(4). Counsel requesting a hearing by conference call will be responsible for
the cost of the call, for setting up the call, and for joining the opposing party on the call.
7. WITNESS DISCLOSURES:
a. Each party shall disclose the existence and identity of intended or potential expert or
lay witnesses not less than forty-two (42) days before trial. Any witness who has not
been timely disclosed will not be permitted to testify at trial upon objection by the
aggrieved party.
b. The disclosure of expert witnesses shall include a complete statement of all opinions to
be expressed; the basis and reasons for the opinion; the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a
summary of or support for the opinions; any qualifications of the witness; the
compensation to be paid for the testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which
23
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the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.
8. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS:
a. A party must identify and disclose any exhibits that party intends or reserves the right
to offer at trial. Not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge
with the Clerk a completed exhibit list in the form attached to this order (Exhibit 1)
and one duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Court's use
during trial; and (B) deliver to counsel for the other party a copy of the exhibit list and
a copy of the party's marked exhibits.
b. Any exhibit which has not been timely disclosed will be excluded. The exhibit list
and duplicate copies need not include exhibits offered solely for the purpose of
impeachment.
c. Exhibits shall be pre-marked. Unless otherwise ordered, the plaintiff shall identify
exhibits beginning with number "l," and the defendant shall identify exhibits
beginning with letter "A."
9. ELEMENT SHEETS: Element Sheets shall be filed with the Clerk (with copies to the
presiding judge's chambers) no later than seven (7) days before trial. Each party's Element Sheet
shall set forth the elements of each claim and the proposed evidence, in specific detail, which the
party believes in good faith will prove each element of the claim and/or affirmative defense. The
Element Sheets will be similar to final "issue" instructions given to juries (see IDJI 1.40.1 through
1.41.4.3).
10. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: A request to vacate or continue an existing
trial setting, with or \Vi.thout a stipulation, will be granted only for unusual and unforeseen
circumstances and when the interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require. A party
24
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requesting to vacate or continue a trial shall file a written statement concerning the reasons for the
request. The requesting party shall certify that the request or stipulation has been discussed with the
other parties.

11. JUDICIAL NOTICE: A request for the Court to take judicial notice of any documents not
in the post-conviction file must comply with I.R.E. 201. Counsel shall provide authenticated copies
of the documents to be judicially noticed under separate cover.
DATED this

'V

day of August, 2015.

/

25

SCHEDULfNG ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL PRFTRIAL ORDLR - 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that this,:.:; day of August, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND
INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
/

V.,, email: mpU@.idlawfirm.com

1.

Michael Patrick Tribe
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 396
Rupert ID 83350

2.

Douglas G Abenroth
Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney
P.0.Box 7

,.,/

~

email: dnoriyuki@cassiacounty.org

Burley ID 83318

,>. . . .
/

(

,j

Ii /rr /V::-) l---

·-·

,:.:·.-c_ 1

I

Tara Gund~rson
Deputy Qlerk

26

SCHEDULING ORDER. NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER - 6

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO
Plaintiffs,

Case No: CV-2013-0000390 D

Vs.

Exhibit List

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff

Defendant

Defendant.

Identifi1er

Descnpt1on

Identified By

Date Offered

Admitted

Exhibit 1 to Scheduling Order

27

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER - 7
rv _'?O 1 'l.<lOOO'NO n . C'o11rt Trial
re,;isod Januarv :?O14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5111 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO·
Filed By: i. f ~
On: 1/19/2016 04:35 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN .
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY
COURT MINUTES

CV-2013-0000390
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 1/19/2016
Time: 4:13 pm
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Courtroom: 1
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Minutes Clerk: Theresa Forthun
Interpreter: Noemi Alanis
4:15pm

Court introductions

4:1spm

All parties are present and with Counsel
Interpreter is present for petitioner

4 : 15 pm

Doug Abenroth addresses court re: Set Evidentiary Hearing for Feb. 29, 2016 @ 1:30pm

4:18pm

Court discusses 2nd motion

4:18pm

Mike Tribe addresses court.

4:20pm

Court addresses Mike Tribe

4:20pm

Mike Tribe addresses court re:
matters in PSI.

4:21pm

Doug Abenroth OBJECTS to PSI. Cites reasons.

4:2 2pm

Court addresses Counsel regarding State vs. Adams

4:26pm

Court grants motion. Court states that Counsel will need to get in touch with clerk regarding
PSI

4:26pm

Court signs Order

4:27pm

Hearing Concludes

Information in PSI. Would like to thoroughly review all
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY
COURT MINUTES
CV-2013-0000390
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Hearing type: State's Motion for Appointment of New Counsel
Hearing date: 2/23/2016
Time: 3: 13 pm
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Courtroom: # 1
Court reporter: Roxanne Patchell
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth
The Court reviews the State's motion for appointment of new counsel.
Douglas Abenroth reviews considerations for the State's Motion for Appointment of New
Counsel; cites considerations.
J:1 7 p.m.

Michael Tribe has no objection; defers to the Court.

3:17 p.m.

The Court would like consent in writing; cites considerations.
Michael Tribe addresses the Court.
The Court leaves the trial as set and transport on.
Michael Tribe addresses the Court.
Douglas Abenroth addresses the Court.

3:26 p.m.

The Court converts the trial on Monday to a Status Conference.
Court in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
Flied By: Tara
On: 2/29/2016 at 01:34 PM

JOSEPH LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO
Plaintiff,
Vs

CASE NO. CV-2013-0000390 D
COURT MINUTES
Status Conference

STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant,
Hearing date: 2/29/2016
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson

Time: 1:33 pm
Courtroom: # 1

Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Michael Tribe
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

t:35 p.m.

1:38 p.m.

Noemi Alanis is present to interpret.
Counsel waive the presence of the Court Reporter, no objection to proceeding with the
electronic recording.
The Court does not conclude that there is an actual conflict with Michael Tribe; cites
considerations.
Michael Tribe addresses the Court; cites they have agreed that it would be best to have
new counsel be appointed; cites considerations.
The State has no further comments.
The Court thanks Mr. Tribe for his services and grants the motion to withdraw and will
appoint new counsel.
Court in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY
COURT MINUTES

CV-2013-0000390
Juan Manuel Arellano, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 5/3/2016
Time: 9:15 am
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Courtroom: # 1
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Party: Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth
The defendant is not present.
Douglas Abenroth addresses the Court.
The Court inquires of Counsel re: transport order.
Steven McRae cites he will need a transport order; reviews status of case.
Evidentiary hearing is set for June 03, 2016 at 2:00 p.m.
9: 17 a.m.

Court in recess.

31

llPage

Arellano's Exhibit List
Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
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Guy B. Zimmerman [ISB No. 9765]
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Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STA TE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

______________
NO.
101

DESCRIPTION
Invoice of Kent Jensen

102

Kent Jensen's Notes

103

106

Transcript of Preliminary
Hearing
Transcript of Arraignment,
Change of Plea and
Sentencing
Sentencing Memorandum
with Authority Cited
Guilty Plea Advisory

107

Plea Agreement

104

105
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Judgment of Conviction and
Order
Psychological Report

109
110

Memorandum in Support of
Rule 35 Motion with
Authority Cited
Rule 35 Motion

111
112

114

Affidavit in Support of
Criminal Complaint
Notice That Death Penalty
Will Not be Sought Re: First
Degree Murder
Affidavit oflrma Ovalle

115

Amended Information

116

Information

117

State's Response to
Discovery Request
First State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Second State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Third State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Fourth State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Fifth State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Seventh State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Eighth State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Ninth State's Supplemental
· Discovery Response
Tenth State's Supplemental
Discovery Response
Eleventh State's
Supplemental Discovery
Rcsp<?nse . . _______
Twelfth State's Supplemental
Discovery Response

113

118

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
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127

128
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
On: 8/2/2016 04:46 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

DOUGLAS G. ABENROTH ([SB #7181)
Prosec!lling Allomey

2
3
4

5

McCORD LARSEN (!SB #8507)
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
PAUL C. JEFFERIES (ISB #9054)
Depu11 Prosec!lling Attorney
Cassia County, Idaho
1459 Overland Ave., Rm. 103

Post Office Box 7
Burley, Idaho 83318
Tele~hone: 208.878.0419
Facs1mile: 208.878.2924

Attorneys for State of Idaho
13-84

6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
7

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

8
9

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,

10
11
12

Case No. CV2013-390

Petitioner-Appellant,

EXHIBIT LIST

vs.

ST ATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

13
14

COMES NOW Douglas G. Abenroth, Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia County, Idaho,

15

and moves the Court to submit the following exhibit list for the evidentiary hearing scheduled for

16

September 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.:

17

1. Photos cell phone text messages and cell phone call log;

18

2. Transcript of translated text messages from Spanish to English;

19

3. Transcript on Appeal;

20

4. Presentence Report.

21
22

23

24
EXHIBIT LIST - 1
H: .CCPA'County Crimmal1DEFENDANTS'Arellano. Juan CV~O 13-390' Exhibit List -Evidentrnry Hrg.docx

35

DATED

thi;)_..i day of August, 2016.

2
DOUGLASG.ABENROTH
Prosecuting Attorney

3
4

By

5

5jjz.

!. #,

.---

6
7
8

ATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on th' '
day of August, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Exhibit List to be serve t pon following:

9

IO
11
12

Steve McRae
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1233
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303
by depositing a copy thereof in the United States mail. postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to
said attorney at the foregoing address.

13
DOUGLAS G. ABENROTH
Prosecuting Attorney

14

15
16

17

18
19

20
21

22

_.,
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24
EXHIBIT LIST - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUN~HO
FiledB~
On: 9/21/2016 at: 03:39 PM

JOSEPH LARSEN
CLERIC OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO
Plaintiff,

Vs

CASE NO. CV-2013-0000390 D
COURT MINUTES
Status Conference

STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.
Hearing date: 9/21/2016
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae
State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

Time: 3:36 pm
Courtroom: # 1
Minutes Cleric Tara Gunderson

All parties are present with Counsel.
Noemi Alanis is present to interpret.
Steven McRae addresses the Court, moves the Court for continuance of trial; cites
considerations.
3:41 p.m.

Douglas Abenroth addresses the Court.

3:44 p.m.

Response by Steven McRae.

3:45 p.m.

The Court addresses Counsel; will vacate trial.
Counsel to get back with the derk to reschedule the trial date.

3:49 p.m.

Court in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5tt1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
Flied By: Tara
On: 1/13/2017 at: 09:02 AM

JOSEPH LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,

Case No. CV-2013-0000390 D

Plaintiff,

COURT MINUTES
Post-Conviction Court Trial

Vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

Hearing date: 1/13/2017
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Juan Arellano, Attorney: Steven McRae

Time: 9:01 am
Courtroom: # 1
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
State of Idaho, Attorney: Douglas Abenroth

Naomi Alanis and Heather Hagen are present to interpret.
Steven McRae addresses the Court re: concurrent and consecutive interpretation.
Interpreter addresses the Court.
Steven McRae cites the parties stipulate to the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 128A Disk; addresses the Court re: written closing arguments; cites considerations.
Douglas Abenroth cites the State is in agreement
9:07 a.m.

Counsel waive opening statements.
Steven McRae calls Plaintiff's# 1 Witness - Kent Jensen, witness sworn by clerk.

9:08a.m.

Direct examination of witness by Steven McRae.

9:17 a.m.

Steven McRae moves for the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit # 102 - Kent Jensen's
notes.
No objection by the State.

Plaintiff's Exhibit# 102- Kent Jensen's Notes -ADMITTED.
9:36a.m.

Steven McRae moves for the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit # 101 - Invoice of Kent
Jensen.
Douglas Abenroth cites the State stipulates to the admission.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit# 101 - Invoice ofKent Jensen -ADMITTED.
9:47a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintiff1s Exhibit 106 - guilty plea advisory form.

Plaintiff's Exhibit# 106 - Guilty Plea Advisory Form -ADMITTED.
10:01 a.m.

Steven McRae moves for the admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit # 109 - Psychological
Report.
No objection by the State.

10:02a.m.

Plaintiff's Exhibit# 109-Psychological Report-ADMITTED.

10:14 a.m.

Court in recess.

10:28 a.m.

Court resumes.

10:29 a.m.

Kent Jensen remains under oath and continues to review plaintiff exhibit # 102; Direct
examination of witness by Steven McRae continues.

10:36a.m.

Plaintiff's Exhibit# 103 - Transcript of Preliminary Hearing - ADMITTED by
stipulation.

10:37a.m.

Plaintiff's Exhibit # 104 - Transcript of Arraignment, Change of Plea and
Sentencing Hearings -ADMITTED by stipulation

10:42 a.m.

Counsel Stipulate to the Admission of Plaintiff's Exhibits 117 through 128A.

10:43a.m.

Plaintiff's Exhibits# 117 through# 128A are ADMITTED.

10:52a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintiff's exhibit 105- Sentencing Memorandum with
Authority Cited.

Plaintiff's exhibit # 105- Sentencing Memorandum with Authority Ched ADMITTED
10:53 a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibit 107 - Plea Agreement

Plaintiff's exhibit# 107- Plea Agreement-Admitted.
10:55 a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibit 108 - Judgment of Conviction.

Plaintiff's exhibit# 108-Judgment of Conviction.
10:56a.m.

Witness reviews Plaintitrs Exhibit 105 - sentencing memorandum.

11:08 a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs Exhibits # 11 Oand # 111.

Plaintiff's Exhibit # 110 - Memorandum in Support of Rule 35 Motion ADMITTED
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 111 - Rule 35 Motion -ADMITTED.
11:11 a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibits# 113

Plaintiff's Exhibh # 113 - Notice re: Death Penalty-ADMITTED.
Counsel stipulate to the admission of Plaintitrs exhibits # 115 & 116
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Plaintiff's Exhibit# 115 -Amended Information -ADMITTED.
Plaintiff's Exhibit# 116- lnfonnation -ADMITTED.
11 : 13 a.m.

Court in recess.

11 :2oa.m.

Court resumes.
Steven McRae has no further questions.

11:21 a.m.

Cross examination of witness by Douglas Abenroth on behalf of the State.

11:27 a.m.

Douglas Abenroth moves for the admission of Defendant's Exhibit # A - photo of text
messages.
No objection by the Plaintiff.

Defendant's Exhibit A - Photos of Text Messages -ADMITTED.
11:35a.m.

Counsel stipulate to the admission of Defendant's Exhibit B - translated text messages.

Defendant's Exhibit B - translated text messages-ADMITTED.
Counsel offer clarification re: exhibit.
11:40a.m.

Objection by Steven McRae; to offer understanding and clarification - cites considerations.

11:58a.m.

Court in recess.

1:32p.m.

Court resumes.
Cross examination, of Plaintiffs# 1 Witness - Kent Jensen, continues.

1:41 p.m.

Re-direct examination of witness my Steven McRae.
Counsel have no further questions - the witness steps down.
The State holds the subpoena in case of rebuttal.
Kent Jensen is excused, instructs the witness that he remains under subpoena and to not
discuss this case.

1=4sp.m.

Court in recess

1:52 p.m.

Court resumes.
Steven McRae calls
Clerk.

Plaintiffs # 2 witness - Juan Manuel Arellano, sworn by

Direct Examination of witness by Steven McRae.
2=18 p.m.

Cross Examination of witness by Douglas Abenroth.

2:19 p.m.

Objection by Steven McRae.
Objection Overruled.

2:21 p.m.

Objection by Steven McRae, cites asked and answered.
Objection overruled.

2=23 p.m.

Objection by Steven McRae, cites asked and answered.
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The Court cites the point is clear, instructs counsel to next question.
2:32 p.m.

Counsel have no further questions - the witness steps down.
The Petitioner rests.

2:32p.m.

Court in recess.

2:46p.m.

Court resumes.
Douglas Abenroth cites the State has no witnesses to call.
The Court cites this concludes the proof.
McRae reviews briefing requests; requests preparation of transcript.
Plaintiff's brief due 30 days after filing of transcript
State has will have 30 days to respond.
Plaintiff's Final Reply due 14 days thereafter.
Counsel waive any formal argument.

2:48p.m.

Court in recess.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
On: 03/16/2017 at 3:05 p.m.
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTJ!l_CT COURT

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
Brian J. Hilverda [ISB No. 7952)
Guy B. Zimmerman [ISB No. 9765]
HIL VERDA MCRAE, PLLC
812 Shoshone Street East
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcRae@MagicValleyLegaLcom

i

Filed BY(!)

Attorneys for Plaintiff
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.
______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-390

PETITIONER'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Juan Manuel Arellano ("Arellano"), by and through his
attorney of record, Steven R. McRae of the finn Hilverda McRae, PLLC, and submits this PostTrial Brief following trial in this matter.
ARGUMENT

The argument is this matter is framed by the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in this case
in Arellano v. State, Idaho Ct. of Appeals Docket No. 41995, May 27, 2015. At its essence, the
issue presented on this post-conviction matter is whether Arellano's attorney in the underlying
case, Kent Jensen ("Jensen"), properly advised him as to the law and elements as they relate to
first-degree murder, second~degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter and whether Jensen
advised Arellano appropriately in the application of the facts to each of these three charges. Id.
PETITIONER'S POST·TR!AL BRIEF·
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At this time, after the trial in this matter, Arellano wishes to further define the scope of his
argument. As is discussed below, Arellano now argues that Kent Jensen was deficient in his
performance as Arellano's attorney as follows: 1) Jensen failed to advise Arellano as to the
elements and application of facts as they relate to second-degree murder (and the difference of
second-degree murder from first-degree murder) and specifically the elements of malice
aforethought and premeditation, and 2) Jensen failed to understand and/or communicate with
Arellano the impact of a potential second-degree murder conviction.
As is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision, this matter is based upon an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and as such, "To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency." Id. citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984).

1. Jensen's performance as Arellano's attorney was deficient in his advice on seconddegree murder and the application of the facts of the case as they relate to the same.
Arellano first asserts that it is clear from the facts of his underlying criminal matter and
from testimony presented at trial that Jensen had a duty to inform Arellano as to the application
of the elements and facts of the case to first-degree murder, the lesser included charge of seconddegree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. Arellano does not herein seek to set forth all of the
facts that would set forth this clear application to the case 1. In fact, Jensen admitted at trial that
the primary issue in Arellano's case was what charge would be appropriate in the underlying
facts. See Transcript atl 7, LL 8-18. However, in the event that the State seeks to argue that
Jensen was not required to analyze the case under each of these potential charges (and
specifically to second-degree murder), Arellano will set forth such foundation in his reply.

1 Such an analysis would review all of the facts contained in the discovery in the underlying criminal case, as was
admitted as Exhibits l l 7- l 28A at trial, the notations of Kent Jensen as were admitted in Exhibit 2 at trial, as well as
the testimony produced by Jensen at trial.
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However, with this basic understanding that Jensen was required to analyze the case - and
discuss such analysis with Arellano - as to all three potential charges, this matter becomes
primarily a factual inquiry as to whether Jensen fulfilled such required performance as
Arellano's attorney.

a. Jensen focused only upon voluntary manslaughter and failed to analyze seconddegree murder when considering the facts of Arellano's case.
To start the factual inquiry in this matter, Arellano asserts that Jensen focused on
voluntary manslaughter in his analysis of Arellano's case and failed to analyze or discuss the
potential of second-degree murder. Throughout all of Jensen's testimony, he made it absolutely
clear that his primary focus was on making a voluntary manslaughter argument in Arellano's
case. See Transcript at 17, LI. 23 through 18, LL 1; at 19, LL 16-25; 23, LL 3-9 ("My focus was
on the idea of voluntary manslaughter, okay? I don't recall w/Jetl,er I /tad a specific disc11ssion

at tlie time wit/, liim regarding tl,e differences between the hvo, but I did explain to him what
voluntary manslaughter was, and that's why we were focusing on his state of mind, the marriage,
the problems that were ongoing at the time.") (emphasis added); at 59, LL 23 through 60, LI. 16;
at 82, IL 8-10 (... we were/oc11sing on vol11ntary manslaughter . ..) (emphasis added); at 84,
LL 7-9 (wherein Jensen shows his focus is only on voluntary manslaughter and first degree

murder); at 106, LL 4-19; and at P. 113, LL 5-8 (wherein Jensen establishes again that his focus
was on only voluntary manslaughter and first degree murder).
In fact, Jensen admitted that the sole defense that he was focused on was voluntary
manslaughter. Transcript at 31, LI. 3-6. Jensen describes voluntary manslaughter was
Arellano's "best defense" and as such was the sole focus of Jensen's inquiry. Id. at 47, LL 12-15
and at 48, LL 2-11.
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Jensen further admitted in his testimony that he had no discussions with Arellano in
regards to second-degree murder, but instead focused only upon making a case for voluntary
manslaughter:

Q. What did you tell or what did you explain to Mr. Arellano was the
tlifference between first degree murder and second degree murder?
A. Well, t/1e explanation centered on, before we were looking at
manslaughter. You go to the bar, you' re there, all of a sudden your wife
comes in with another man, you're upset, you walk out, shoot her.
Explained to llim tl,at tl,at's something that /1appens in the /,eat of
passion. Tl,e law looks at that differently. There's a potential maximum
penalty, 15 years, as I recall for voluntary manslaughter. I explained that
to him.

I then explained to him once we got this text message it changed the focus
there. I said, the problem that you have at this point in the case is that you
were in the bar with your pistol. There was no indication that you left the
bar, went out to the car and got your pistol and came back in and shot her.
You were there with your pistol, she walked in and you shot her, and now
they have a message that you sent within a few hours of this occurring,
saying that you were going to, basically, kill her. At lest that's what the
message seems to indicate.

I explained to him that that changes that. We were going to have an
impossible task ofconvincing a iury that you did this in the !,eat of
passion, based on tl,e fact that yo11 sent a text message out, you liad your
pistol inside tlle bar, and tltis was a place sl,e was going to be showing
up at, by probabilities, and tltey you slroot lier.
Transcript at 39, LL 19 through 40, LL 21. (emphasis added). Thus, even upon being asked
about second-degree murder, Jensen only focuses on a heat of passion/ voluntary manslaughter
defense in his answer at the trial in this matter. Further, Jensen testified:
Q .... And I heard you discussing a lot about voluntary manslaughter.
Did you have any discussions with Mr. Arellano about the difference

between first degree and second degree murder?
A. You know, I don't recall l1ow detailed those discussions would /,ave
been. I'd looked at it, I know I researched and looked at the statutes and
talked to him about it. I'm pretty sure I told llim that there wasn't a

wl,ole lot of difference between tl,e two statutes, but there wouldn't be
any deat/1 penalty involved with second degree murder. But I don't know
how specific. I just don't recall.
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Id at 41, LL 7-18. (emphasis added). Jensen later admitted that he did not consider second-

degree murder "in play" in Arellano's case:
A ... I couldn't get [the prosecutor] to accept anything less than [first
degree murder J. So as far as second degree murder goes, I don't recall if
it was ever in play, otl,er than I guess it could /,ave been a potential
lesser inch,ded offense tl,an tlte first degree murder if t/1e case /tad gone
to trial.
Id. at 76, LL 14-19. (Emphasis added). Finally, Jensen admitted outright that he did not speak

with Arellano in regards to the difference between first degree murder and second degree
murder:
Q. And you don't specifically recall having discussion with him about the
difference between a first degree murder charge and a second degree
murder charge?
A. To tell you tl,e trutl,, I don't. And I believe part of the reason/or
tJ,at was that Mr. Cannon j11st didn't make that offer to 11s at all.

Id. at I 01, Ll. 17-20. With this clear admission of Jensen, Arellano was never advised as to the

potential of a second degree murder charge or its interplay with the facts of Arellano's case simply because Jensen did not think that the prosecutor would offer it, and despite his admission
that it would be a potential lesser included offense had the case gone to trial.
Additionally, Jensen's focus solely on voluntary manslaughter became readily apparent
after the text message was discovered to Jensen and Arellano2• After receiving the discovery of
the text message of Arellano, Jensen admitted that he only focused on this evidence's application
to voluntary manslaughter and not to second-degree murder:
A. The conversation involved looking at the evidence from wit at wo11/d
be establislted and if we we11t al,ead wit!, tl,e voluntary manslaughter
defense. They would use the text to show that he had designs to carry out
this crime. that he'd thought about it and sent a text message ahead. Mr.
Arellano disagreed with that particular point.

The specific text message at issue was interpreted to say, "I'm going to kill that whore", as was discussed at length
in trial.

2
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So, I didn't think we could win a voluntary mansla11ghter defe11se, so at
that point we were trying to figure 0111 tl,e best option for Mr. Arellano.
I discussed with him that he could enter a plea. He wouldn't have to
acknowledge that particular element of the crime, we could take advantage
of the plea agreement which had been offered and we could- as I stated
earlier, we could actually argue for less at sentencing.

Id. at 59, LI. 23 through 60, LI. 16 ( emphasis added). From this testimony, it is clear that Jensen
solely focused on the voluntary manslaughter defense, as he could not describe in any detail, any
explanation or analysis he may have discussed with Arellano as it related to second-degree
murder. Moreover, Jensen stated furthi::r in regards to the text message:

A. ... But once that text message showed upon that cl,anged tl,e

calculus because it was going to he very hard for us to walk in and argue
that he did all oft!,is in the heat of passion, having just sent tltis text
earlier. So at that juncture I know we had that discussion about the
prospects of going to trial and the difference. Whereas then the intent,
premeditated and all that stuff, comes into play and that bolsters the state's
case. We had that discussion, yes.

Id. at 24, Ll. 12-20. Here, again, Jensen admits that the only consideration after receiving the
text was that it would hurt the heat of passion/ voluntary manslaughter argument. He later
explained that he thought the text, "blew a hole right through the voluntary manslaughter
defense", again, with no discussion as to how it may or may not have affected a second-degree
murder argument for Arellano's case. See Transcript at 85, ll. 15-20. See also Transcript at 98,
Ll. 6-13 (" When I saw tliis particular text message witf1in two or tf,ree /tours of tl,e actual

killing, in my opinio11, we no longer had that argument that was it was done in passion or in
tile heat of the moment.").
Furthermore, it is clear that Jensen should have discussed second degree murder elements
and application to Arellano's case, specifically in consideration of information that Arellano
provided to Mr. Jensen. In Jensen's notes, as admitted at trial as Exhibit 102 (and the 4th page
thereof), Jensen took a note from Arellano, in which Jensen wrote, "Says went to shoot wife -

PETITIONER'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF· 6
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but not there when arrived & how would know". In discussing this statement with Arellano,
Jensen admits that it was a critical piece of infonnation:
A. Says: Went to shoot wife, but not there when arrived. How could
know.

Q. So what does that mean to you?
A. This would have been a comment that Mr. Arellano made to me.

Q. And so to make sure I read it, it says, [ quote, it says: Went to shoot
wife- but not there when arrived. And: how would know, end quote.
A. Correct.
Q. Why do you think that would have been important to take note of?
A. Seemed to be a critical piece of information Mr. Arellano was telling

me.

Transcripl at 46, LL 5-17 (emphasis added). In analyzing this note from Arellano, it is clear that
he communicated to Jensen that he was at the bar before his wife (the victim), and there was no
indication in the facts of the case that Arellano would have known that his wife was going to
show up at the bar. This is highly relevant in fighting the premeditation element of first-degree
murder; as such, it is relevant to both a voluntary manslaughter defense and potential outcome of
second-degree murder at trial. However, Jensen, in discussing this statement of Arellano and his
note on the same, testified that he only discussed the application of the note in regards to
voluntary manslaughter:
A. Well, I don't know. Again, you can look at this two ways. At the
time tire note had been made we were still tliinking of voluntary
manslaughter. So if he's telling me he didn't know she was going to be
there and she did show up, then we could make an argument. But that's
the way I just wrote it down. I don't know that we /,ad anymore
discussion about J,im going to the bar at that point.
Q. You just said you were still going for voluntary manslaughter?
A. Correct.

Q. Does that mean tliat second degree murder was not in your focus at
all?
PETITIONER'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF· 7
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I doubt it, because, again, it gets back to w/1at
was tlte best defense available to ltim, and voluntary manslaugltter
appeared to be tlte best one at that point.
A. Well, I'd probably -

Id. at 46, LL 25 through 47, LL 15 (emphasis added). At another time, Jensen admits that he
doesn't even know if he and Arellano discussed this information at all, let alone in the context of
how the contents thereof might apply to second-degree murder. Jensen stated, "I don't recall if
we did or not focus on that particular point." Id. at 42, ll. 21-22.

1
I

I

Finally, another notation of Jensen is in the same line of reason and demonstrates (with
Jensen's testimony on the same) that he failed to discuss second-degree murder with Arellano,
despite the need to do so. Also on Exhibit 2, on the third to the last page of the same, Jensen
wrote (while watching a video of Arellano), "I didn't expect her to show." During his testimony
on the same, Jensen explained:
Q. Just a couple of questions on I believe just two lines. If you look at the

first page that has the 1 with the circle on top, about two-thirds down it
says - if I read this right - "I guess so." Then the next line, "I didn't
expect her to show."
A. Correct.
Q. And what- do you recall why you wrote that down?
A. Well, again, it would be the whole idea of voluntary manslai,g/iter
defense wout,l be that - basically the classic example is somebody comes
home and finds their spouse or significant other in bed wit/1 somebody
and shoots tl1em i11 the /teat ofpassion. In that particular point I made a
note of that, that well, he said, knew he was there - on, no, "I didn't
expect her to show up", yeah. Again, using that with regard to a voluntary
manslaughter defense, where he's there, doesn't expect her to show up, all
of a sudden she does show up with another man, is out dancing with that
particular man. So that's why I would have made that particular note.

Transcript at 56, LL 1M20 (emphasis added). Again, the fact that Arellano was not expecting his
wife (the victim) to show is critical in considering whether there was premeditation - and as
such, would apply to both potentials at trial of voluntary manslaughter and second-degree
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murder. And, when Jensen explains the application, he again completely misses the potential
application towards second-degree murder.
All of the foregoing demonstrate that there was a significant need for Jensen to explain
and discuss all of the elements of first-degree murder, second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter with Arellano. However, it is clear that Jensen only focused on first-degree
murder and voluntary manslaughter, leaving out in its entirety a significant potential outcome of
Arellano's case a potential second degree murder conviction. Arellano, in not having any
explanation as to second-degree murder in entering his Alford plea to first-degree murder,
entered his plea without being provided the needed details for him to make a reason and
informed decision in entering his plea. And, this deficiency is clearly based upon Jensen failing
to discuss the elements and application of the facts to the same on second-degree murder.
b. Jensen's knowledge of the difference between first-degree murder and seconddegree murder was clearly flawed, and as such, Jensen clearly could not have
adequately advised Arellano prior to his entering a guilty plea.
Next, in considering whether Jensen appropriately advised Arellano as to the potential
outcome of second-degree murder, it is clear from Jensen's testimony that Jensen did not even
understand difference between first-degree murder nor did he understand the difference that
having a second-degree murder conviction would make at sentencing.
First, as to the elements of first degree murder and second degree murder, at trial, Jensen
testified:

Q.... [C]an you tell me all of the elements mental elements of first
degree murder that you discussed with Mr. Arellano?
A. Well, I can't tell you specifically. It's been too long ago. But the
discussion would have revolved around the facts. The fact that he was
sending a text; the fact of him going in with a pistol, a loaded gun, and to a
place where he could anticipate she would show up, and that those specific
things indicated that he had a plan that he was devising or had devised that
he was going to use in carrying out the crime.
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Transcript at 113, LL 8-18. Jensen was unable to identify the elements (or the difference in
elements) as to first-degree murder and second-degree murder. In every question relating to the
elements of second-degree murder, Jensen always testified as to the facts of the case without
providing any detail as to what he knew the elements to be.
What's worse is that in Jensen's testimony as to the elements of first-degree murder (and
the difference between second-degree murder), Jensen was wrong as to what malice is. Jensen
testified (in discussing Arellano's change of plea as an Alford plea):
Q .... And here the court was talking about - had said malice
aforethought or premeditation element. And did you see those two
elements as being the same thing?

A. No, not necessarily, because I think ifyou !,ave malice aforethought
that's a little higher standard than premeditation.
Q. What do you mean by that?

A. Malice generally implies that it's something a little beyond just- I

guess I would consider malice aforethought as to wliere somebody sits
down and decides to - plans to commit a crime probably maybe even in a
way that could be way beyond w/zat we would even consider - if there
was anything to be said about a normal murder type of a case - but it
certainly reflects more of an evil i11tent titan what I would consider
premeditation.
Transcript at 63, Ll. 19 through 64, LL 5 (emphasis added). Jensen's consideration of malice
aforethought as a higher standard than premeditation flies in the face of the law in the State of
Idaho. It is clear under Idaho law that malice is an element of both first and second degree
murder. See Idaho Code§§ 18-4001, 4002, and 4003; State v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 530,531,873
P.2d 784, 785 (1993); and State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 362, 690 P.2d 293, 297 (1984). In
fact, it is clear from the aforementioned citations that it is premeditation that distinguishes first
degree murder from second degree murder. As such, Jensen, in thinking that "malice
aforethought that's a little higher standard than premeditation" is completely incorrect. And, it
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appears, then, that Jensen could not and did not properly advise Arellano as to the appropriate
elements of first-degree murder and second-degree murder.
This is even more important in considering that Arellano entered an Alford plea to the
malice aforethought and premeditation. See, Exhibit I 04, Transcript ofChange of Plea Hearing

("COP Transcript'') at 18, LL 18-23. What is important to review in the COP Transcript is that
no person - either Jensen or the Court - actually explained to Arellano what malice aforethought
or premeditation was. The prosecutor at.that hearing addressed this in stating:
Your Honor, maybe before I do that, I wonder if- to the extent there
might be a difference between malice aforethought and premeditation, I
don't know if there needs to be an additional question to the defendant
about acknowledging the premeditation as part of the guilty plea pursuant
to Alford or if that's already been done?

COP Transcript at 26, LL 12-19. Following this inquiry, Mr. Cannon set forth what he saw the
facts to be that would support premeditation. Id. at 27-29. However, after the facts were stated,
no person inquired of Mr. Arellano as to whether he understood what malice aforethought was,
whether he understood what premeditation was, or whether he believed the stated facts would
show malice aforethought or premeditation. Instead, the following inquiry occurred:
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cannon. Mr. Arellano, if the evidence
was presented to a jury as Mr. Cannon just described, I think there is a
sufficiently strong indication that a jury could find you guilty of the
element of premeditation or malice aforethought, and I will so indicate to
you with respect to your North Carolina vs. Alford plea on that element.
Mr. Arellano, do you want to /rave a trial? We have a trial date
scheduled for you in January.
THE DEFENDANT: No.

COP Transcript at 29, L. 22 through 30, LL 7. At no time did anyone ask Arellano any question
that would indicate that he actually understood the elements of malice aforethought or
premeditation. And, if Jensen did have a discussion with Arellano on the same (which is most
likely not the case, as explained above), Jensen would have provided incorrect legal information
on these elements.
PETmONER'S POST·TRIAL BRIEF • 11
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Finally, the record is also clear that Jensen simply viewed the role of a potential seconddegree murder conviction in an incorrect way - as being the same as a first-degree murder
conviction. Jensen testified:
Q. Mr. Jensen, you testified earlier during direct that it was your feeling

that voluntary manslaughter was the best defense for the defendant,
instead of second degree murder, lesser included on first degree. Why is
that?
A. First degree and second degree murder have life sentences. If we're

!""'

looking at an alternate 011tcome obviously, I guess,Jor visual aspects,
second degree looks better tl1an1irsi degree, but Jliey still liave the same
maximum penalty. So I didn't see there was a big difference tl,ere to be
gained. But if we co11/d win a voluntary manslaughter defense then
obvio11sly we've taken tl,e life sentence off tl1e table and gotten tl,e
maximum sentence down to 15 years.
Transcript at 108, Ll. 10-18. Jensen, in failing to see a difference between first-degree murder
and second-degree murder, completely failed to analyze the elements of the charges, the
potential penalties for the charges, or the potential outcomes at a sentencing hearing for both
charges.
What is the most ironic part of this matter is that Jensen, in preparing for sentencing,
thought that Arellano had entered a plea to second-degree murder. Jensen lodged with the Court
a Sentencing Memorandum (introduced as Exhibit 105 at trial in this matter), in which Jensen
states, "Mr. Arellano pied guilty to second-degree murder ... "3 The most ironic part of Jensen's
Sentencing Memorandum, though, is that he cited cases to support a lesser penalty for Arellano and, all of the cases that he cited were second-degree murder cases. And, it's clear that he cited
the cases in the Sentencing Memorandum because they were the most similar to what Jensen
wanted to argue, in way of sentencing. These cases - and the sentencing memorandum - simply
demonstrate that a second degree murder conviction would have greatly benefitted Arellano,
despite Jensen not seeing the difference between first and second degree murder convictions.
Jensen continued his belief that Arellano plead guilty to second degree murder at the trial in this matter until his
thought was corrected by counsel. See Transcript at 68, LI. 9-10.

3
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With all of the comments above, it is clear that Jensen failed to address a second degree
murder potential, failed to understand the difference between the elements of first and second
degree murder, failed to understand the difference that a conviction to second degree murder
could make at sentencing, failed to understand what Arellano actually entered a plea to, and
failed entirely in advising Arellano as to the potential outcome of a second-degree murder
conviction. As such, when Arellano entered his Alford plea, he simply could not have been
doing so knowingly and voluntarily because of Jensen's deficient performance as Arellano's
counsel. And, with that, the first prong of Strickland is clearly met.
2. Had Jensen's performance as Arellano's attorney not been deficient in his advice on
second-degree murder and the application of the facts of the case as they relate to
the same, Arellano would not have entered his plea and would have proceeded to
trial.

Arellano testified clearly at the trial in this matter that now that he has learned of the
differences between first and second degree murder (and the elements of malice aforethought
and premeditation), that he wants to proceed to trial. Transcript at 125-126. Arellano testified
that he wants to go to trial because he did not have the intention to kill his wife. Id. at 126, LL
11-19. Furthermore, in looking at all of the facts (as described above), there is a real potential
for an outcome of a second-degree murder conviction at trial. As such, had Jensen advised
Arellano appropriately as to a potential argument of second-degree murder (both in the elements
and potential penalties on the same), Arellano would have gone to trial. With this, the second
prong of Strickland is clearly established.
In the very least, Arellano should have the ability to understand the elements of the crime
for which he is charged, the potential defenses, and the potential lesser-included offenses of
which he could be found guilty before entering a guilty plea to first degree murder.
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CONCLUSION
Petitioner requests that this Court allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed forward to trial.
DATED this 161h day of March, 2017.
HILVERDA McRAE, PLLC

By:

c ~
Stcv<:.McRae
Attorney for Defendant
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1459 Overland Avenue, 3111 Floor
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Burley, Idaho 833 I 8
Telephone: 208.878.0419
Facsimile: 208.878.2924

Attorneys for State of Idaho
13-84

6
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

7

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

8
9

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,

10

11

Case No. CV 2013-390

Petitioner,
vs.

RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF

STATE OF IDAHO,
12
13
14

Respondent.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-.cl
COMES NOW, Respondent, the State ofldaho, by and through Cassia County Prosecuting

15

Attorney Douglas G. Abenroth, and does hereby provide this post-trial brief in opposition to

16

Petitioner Juan Manuel Arellano's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Idaho Code

17

Section 19-4906(c).

18
19
20

I.
Factual And Procedural History
On December 30, 2010, the Petitioner Juan Manuel Arellano (hereinafter "Arellano") pied

21

guilty to murder in the first degree with an enhanced penalty for use of a firearm or deadly weapon in

22

violation ofldaho Code§§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003, and 19-2520 in the District Court of the Fifth

23

Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for Cassia County in Cassia County Criminal Case No.

24

CR-2010-4251 (hereinafter "underlying criminal case").
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On April 28, 2011, the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and

2

for Cassia County, entered a judgment of conviction against Arellano in the underlying criminal case,

3

for murder in the first degree with an enhanced penalty for use of a fireann or deadly weapon in

4

violation ofldaho Code§§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003, and 19-2520. The District Court sentenced

5

Arellano to a unified tenn of life, with a minimum period of confinement of twenty-two (22) years, and

6

this sentence was imposed. Arellano was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho Department of

7

Corrections to serve his unified life sentence.

8

On May 16, 2011, Arellano filed a motion for relief under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 seeking a

9

reduction of his sentence. On May 19, 2011, the State ofldaho filed an objection to Arellano's Rule 35

10

motion. The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Cassia County,

11

entered an order denying Arellano's Rule 35 motion on May 23, 2011.

12

Arellano filed a Notice of Appeal of his judgment of conviction and the denial of his Rule 35

13

motion with the Idaho Court of Appeals. On appeal, Arellano argued his sentence was excessive. The

14

Idaho Court of Appeals affinned the trial court's judgment of conviction and his sentence on May 7,

15

2012. The Idaho Court of Appeals issued a Remittitur on May 31, 2012.

16

On May 1, 2013, Arellano filed a petition for post-conviction relief, a supporting brief, his own

17

affidavit in support of said petition, and attached exhibits to said affidavit. The State of Idaho filed an

18

answer to the above-entitled post-conviction petition on May 20, 2013. On November 14, 2013, the

19

State of Idaho filed a motion for summary dismissal and motion for summary disposition with a

20

supporting brief and affidavit. On February 5, 2014, Arellano filed an objection to the State's motion

21

for summary disposition. On February 12, 2014, the State filed a reply brief in support of its motions

22

for summary dismissal and summary disposition. On February 18, 2014, the Court issued an order

23

granting the State's motion for summary disposition.

24
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1

On March 19, 20 l 4, Arellano filed a notice of appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court and the

2

Supreme Court assigned the case to the Idaho Court of Appeals. Specifically, Arellano appealed the

3

Court's granting of the State's motion for summary disposition. On May 27, 2015, the Idaho Court of

4

Appeals issued an opinion affirming the District Court's decision to grant the State's motion for

5

summary disposition, in part, and also vacating in part the District's decision on said motion. The

6

Court of Appeals remanded the case to District Court for an evidentiary hearing on one issue raised in

7

Arellano's petition for post-conviction relief.

8

Upon remand, the one issue remaining to litigate in Arellano's petition for post-conviction

9

relief is whether Arellano allegedly informed his defense counsel, Kent Jensen (hereinafter "Mr.

10

Jensen), about his mental state when he killed his wife and whether Mr. Jensen allegedly informed him

11

that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant in his underlying criminal case. See Arellano v.

12 State ofIdaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 4-5. The Idaho Court
13

of Appeals held Arellano had alleged a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr.

14 Jensen in his petition for post-conviction relief on this issue of mental intent and remanded for an
15

evidentiary hearing on this limited issue. Id. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on this

16

issue on January 13, 2017.

17

Based upon the applicable law and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Court

18

should deny Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen regarding this

19

limited issue of mental intent and dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief.

20

II.
Legal Standards

21
22

A.

General Standards

An application for post-conviction relief initiates a new civil proceeding and the petitioner
23

bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief.
24
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1
2

3
4

5

(

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,522, 164 P.3d 798,802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,
678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,830,452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Mu"ay v.

State, 121 Idaho 918,921,828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App.1992); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816,
892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). "Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction
relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-

6

conviction reliefis based.'' Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 PJd at 802, citing Grube v. State, 134

7

Idaho 24, 995 P2d 794 (2000); see also I.C. § 19-4907; see also Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794

8

P.2d 654,656 (Ct. App. 1990).

9

The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each essential element of

10

the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual allegations. Roman v.

11

State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822,824, 702

12

P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may take judicial notice of the record of the

13

underlying criminal case. Hays v. Stale, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P2d 758, 761 (Ct. App. 1987), affd

14

115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,842

15

P.2d 660 (1992).

16

B.

17

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate both

Legal Standards AQPlicable for Proving a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

l8

that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (b) there is a

19

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been

20

different Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118,

21

937 P.2d 427,430 (Ct. App. 1997). "Because of the distorting effects ofhindsight in reconstructing the

22

circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong preswnption that counsel's

23

performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance-that is, 'sound trial

24

strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
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1

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A

2

petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made

3

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" to establish that counsel's

4

5
6

perfonnance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v.

Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Str(Q}dand, 466 U.S. at 690).
"When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-

7

guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction

8

relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

9

relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,

10

561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008), citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,584, 6 P.3d 831,834 (2000).

11

"There is a strong presumption that counsel's perfonnance fell within the wide range of professional

12

assistance." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136, citing State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho

13

496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 ( 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State, 114

14

Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)).

15

Thus, the first element - deficient perfonnance -

"D requires showing that counsel made errors

16

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

l7

Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second element-prejudice- requires a showing that

18

counsel's deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's

19

deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been

20

different Id at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685, 978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct App. 1999).

21

Regarding the second element, a Petitioner has the burden of showing that his or her trial counsel's

22

deficient conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot

23

be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,

24

80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). As explained in Ivey v. State, the "constitutional requirement for
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1

effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long

2

series of examples of how the case might have been tried better." Id., 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709.

3

m.
Argument

4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

Arellano alleges that his defense counsel, Kent Jensen, was ineffective in representing Arellano
in his underlying criminal case. Specifically, the factual claim before the Court on remand from the
Idaho Court of Appeals is whether Arellano allegedly infonned Mr. Jensen about his mental state when
he killed his wife and whether Mr. Jensen allegedly infonned him that facts concerning his mental state
were irrelevant in his underlying criminal case. See Arellano v. State ofIdaho, Idaho Court of Appeals
2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 4-5. However, Arellano' s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim against Mr. Jensen fails to state any claim for relief. As such, Arellano was not denied due
process oflaw by any alleged ineffectiveness of counsel in his underlying criminal case. Therefore, the
Court should deny Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and dismiss Arellano's petition
for post-conviction relief.

In framing the issue for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Idaho Court of Appeals
first relied upon certain factual allegations contained within Arellano's petition for post-conviction
relief regarding his mental state in killing his wife which are as follows:
29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with violence against his
wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident because of the blind rage upon seeing her
come back into the bar after her lover had escorted her out
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state was lacking on all
the assault charges as he was under the influence of two drugs and the culmination of emotions
that his wife intentionally provoked.
51. No one knows wh[at] petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun and walked out onto
the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his emotions overwhelmed him, and wanted to rant
and rave.
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the heat of his passion as he
was attempting to scare her. He never intended to kill her, but the rage within was so
overwhelming that he was out of control and even more by the acts of others.
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2
3
4

5

6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22

23

(

54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with a weapon in the heat
of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she intentionally came back into the bar.

See Arellano v. State ofIdaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 3-4,
see also Petition for Post-Conviction, pp. 6, 9.
The Court of Appeals then relied upon the following assertions by Arellano against Mr. Jensen
in support of its decision that aprimafacie case existed in supporting Arellano's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim regarding his mental intent:
53. Under the professional norms counsel's assistance amounted to incompetence. Counsel
failed entirely in his representation.
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist[s] a reasonable probability that but for counsel's
representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
57. Counsel's failures prejudice[d] petitioner and if he would have fulfilled his obligations he
would never have been convicted of any of the charges filed by information.
58. Petitioner advised his attorney [of] his version of the facts surrounding the death of his wife.
Yet counsel insisted that some of these facts were irrelevant, and that if he went to trial he
would be found guilty. As a result of counsel refusing to participate in petitioner's defense he
entered a guilty plea.

See Arellano v. State ofIdaho, Idaho Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, p. 4, see
also Petition for Post-Conviction, p. 9.
Based upon Idaho law, Arellano had the burden of proving these specific assertions as alleged
in his petition for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence during his evidentiary
hearing held on January 13, 2017. See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. Arellano
failed to satisfy his burden of proof during the evidentiary hearing in proving these specific allegations.
During the evidentiary hearing, and in his post-trial brief, Arellano attempts to refrarne the
relevant issue as articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Rather than trying to prove I) whether
Arellano allegedly informed Mr. Jensen about his mental state when he killed his wife and 2) whether
Mr. Jensen allegedly informed him that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant, Arellano

24
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1

attempts to prove and argue a different claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. Jensen.

2

Arellano now claims Mr. Jensen was deficient. in violation of Strickland v. Washington, supra, in the

3

following manner: 1) Mr. Jensen failed to advise Arellano as to the elements and facts relating to

4

second-degree murder, including the difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder

5

and specifically the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation, and 2) Mr. Jensen failed to

6

understand and/or communicate with Arellano the impact of a potential second-degree murder

7

conviction. See Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief, p. 2.

8
9

First, Arellano's attempt to refine, amend, or change his claim(s) of ineffective assistance of
counsel against Mr. Jensen in his post-trial brief is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of Civil

1O Procedure. Arellano never moved to amend his claim(s) as alleged in his petition for post-conviction

11

relief prior to, or during, the evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

12

Moreover, the Court never granted an amendment of Arellano' s claim(s) prior to, or during, the

13

evidentiary hearing on January 13, 2017. As such, Arellano is prohibited from amending his claim at

14

this stage of the proceedings as the State of Idaho would be prejudiced for lack of notice of said

15

claim(s).

16

Second, even if the Court allows Arellano to allege, and argue, his amended claims of

17

ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. Jensen, he has failed to satisfy the burden of proof for said

18 claims. During the evidentiary hearing, Arellano presented the testimony of two witnesses: Mr. Jensen
19

and himself. Arellano also presented numerous exhibits which the Court admitted by stipulation

20

between the parties or by Arellano laying sufficient foundation. Further, the State ofldaho presented

21

multiple exhibits which the Court admitted by way of stipulation between the parties.

22

On its own, the testimony of Mr. Jensen establishes that a) his performance as counsel for

23

Arellano during the underlying criminal proceeding did not fall below an objective standard of

24

reasonableness, and b) that Arellano was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiency of Mr. Jensen. See
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Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25.
2

Moreover, State's Exhibits A and B, which were admitted into evidence during the evidentiary hearing,

3

assist in establishing Mr. Jensen was not deficient in his perfonnance as counsel for Arellano nor did

4

any alleged deficiency of, or by, Mr. Jensen prejudice Arellano in his underlying criminal case. In

5

short, Mr. Jensen testified he discussed the requisite mental intent for first-degree murder with

6

Arellano, and specifically, did so after receiving discovery containing text messages sent by Arellano

7

to a friend a few hours prior to killing his wife. See Transcript. p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's

8

Exhibits A and B.

9

Mr. Jensen's testimony, and State's Exhibits A and B, establish 1) Mr. Jensen discussed

10

Arellano's mental state (i.e. mental intent) when he killed his wife and 2) Mr. Jensen did not inform

11

Arellano that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant. See Arellano v. State ofIdaho, Idaho

12

Court of Appeals 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2015, pp. 3-5; see also Petition for Post-Conviction,

13

pp. 6, 9. In contrast, Mr. Jensen did discuss Arellano's mental state/mental intent when he killed his

14

wife with Arellano. See Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's Exhibits A and B. Mr.

15

Jensen also did not tell Arellano his mental state/mental intent at the time he killed his wife was

16

irrelevant See Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's Exhibits A and B. Therefore,

17

Arellano has not satisfied either the first or second prongs of Strickland v. Washington, supra, and has

18

not proven an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen on the issue remanded by the

19

Idaho Court of Appeals to the District Court. As a result, the Court should dismiss Arellano's petition

20

for post-conviction relief.

21

In addition, Arellano ex.pends much effort in arguing Mr. Jensen's deficiency, and subsequent

22

prejudice to Arellano, regarding Mr. Jensen's failure to explain the mental intent required for second-

23

degree murder. See generally Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief.The record disproves this argument. Mr.

24

Jensen testified that he "couldn't get [the prosecutor] to accept anything less than [first degree murder].
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H:ICCPAIC01111ty Criminal\DEFENDANTS\ARllano, Juan\CV20 IJ.390\Respondenl's Post•Trial Brief.doc

65

/

1

So as far as second degree murder goes, I don't recall if it was ever in play, other than I guess it could

2

have been a potential lesser included offense than the first degree murder if the case had gone to trial."

3

See Transcript, p. 76, LI. 14-19. Moreover, Mr. Jensen did not recall having a discussion with Arellano

4

about the difference between first-degree murder and second-degree murder and testified he believed

5

part of the reason for that ''was [the prosecutor] just didn't make that offer to us at all." See Transcript,

6

p. 101, LI. 17-20. Since the parties resolved the underlying criminal case through plea negotiations

7

wherein the prosecutor for the State of Idaho never offered second-degree murder or voluntary

8

manslaughter to Arellano pursuant to those negotiations, it is not deficient performance by Mr. Jensen

9

to not discuss a crime (i.e. second-degree murder and/or voluntary manslaughter) which is not offered

10

by the State to the defendant (i.e. Arellano). Second-degree murder was not even option for Arellano to

11

consider during plea negotiations, and as such, it is reasonable for Mr. Jensen to not discuss something

12

with Arellano that is not ever offered by the State in negotiations. See Transcript, p. 76, LI. 14-19; see

13

also Transcript, p. 101, LI. 17-20. Therefore, Mr. Jensen satisfied the requirements of Stricklandv.

14

Washington, supra.

15

Furthermore, since the underlying criminal case never went to trial, Mr. Jensen did not have the

16

opportunity to even present a lesser included defense, or jury instruction, for second-degree murder or

17

voluntary manslaughter to a jury. However, even though the underlying criminal case never went to

18

trial, the record establishes Mr. Jensen did discuss with Arellano his mental state/mental intent at the

19

time he killed his wife and discussed the relevancy of said mental state/mental intent with Arellano.

20

See Transcript, p. 8, L. 20-p. 117, L. 25, see also State's Exhibits A and B. Thus, Mr. Jensen satisfied

21

the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, supra.

22
23
24
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IV.
Conclusion

2
3
4

5
6

7
8

Arellano's petition for post-conviction relief fails to establish his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for the issue remanded by the Idaho Court of Appeals to the District Court.
The Court should deny Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen regarding
the limited issue of mental intent, and its relevancy to Arellano's underlying criminal case, and dismiss
his petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2017.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
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vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.
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)
)

Case No. CV-2013-390
PETITIO:NER'S REPLY POST-TRIAL
BRIEF

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Juan Manuel Arellano ("Arellano"), by and through his
attorney of record, Steven R. McRae of the firm Hilverda McRae, PLLC, and submits this Reply
Post-Trial Brief (this ..Reply'J in response to the State's Respondent's Post-Trial Brief (the

~~Respondent's Brief').
ARGUMENT
This Reply is made to address the specific issues raised in the Respondent's Brief
Petitioner continues to rely on the Petitioner's Post-Trial Briefas has been filed previously and
relies on the arguments set forth therein.

68

T"II, _ _ _ ..._ . . . - • - .... _ _ _

••

n-.--. ..,.._,.. ...

n--- •

1.

THE ST ATE CAN NO LONGER ARGUE THAT PETITIONER'S PETITIONER FAILS TO ST ATE
ANY CLAIM FOR RELIEF,

The State argues, "Arellano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. Jensen
fails to state any claim for relief.., Respondent's Brief at 6. The State then asks this Court to
deny Petitioner's petition on such grounds. This argument has already been decided and framed
by the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in this case. Arellano v. State, 2015 Opinion No. 30,
May 27, 2017. The Court of Appeals held in the same that Petitioner's petition did state a claim
for relief, and 1he same further defined the issue that was to be trieu at evidentiary hearing (as is
described in detail below).
The State's argument that Petitioner's claims (and in particular those claims ruled by the
Idaho Court of Appeals) should be summary dismissed have been decided, and this Court must
now analyze the information as was presented at evidentiary hearing in conjunction with the
issues allowed to be presented by the Idaho Court of Appeals decision.

2. PETITIONER ts ARGUMENTS ARE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE PARAMETERS AS SET FORTH BY
THE IDAHO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION.

The State next argues that Petitioner has attempted to "refine, amend, or change" his
claims following the hearing in this matter. Respondent's Brief at 8. Petitioner framed the issues
in his Post-Trial Brief as follows:
... Arellano now argues that Kent Jensen was deficient in his performance as
Arellano's attorney as follows: 1) Jensen failed to advise Arellano as to the
elements and application of facts as they relate to second-degree murder (and
the difference of second-degree murder from first-degree murder) and
specifically the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation, and 2)
Jensen failed to understand and/or communicate with Arellano the impact of a
potential second-degree murder conviction.

See Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief at 2.
This framework for the Petitioner's argument is within the scope set forth by the Idaho
Court of Appeals decision. The relevant portion of the same is as follows:
69

This Court interprets assertion 58, based on the other relevant assertions listed
in the petition, to aver that Are/la,ro informed defense counsel about his

mental state when he killed his wife and that defense counsel informed him
that facts concerning his mental stqte were Irrelevant. This interpretation is
bolstered by Arellano's objection to the motion for summary dismissal, in
which counsel explained that Arellano "avers that his {defense} counsel

advised him that his mental state at the time of the alleged htcide11t was not
relevant to the case." This interpretation is also consistent with the district
court's characterization of the claim, in which it explained that "Arellano
contends that [defense counsel] told him that evidence of the victim's intentions
and his mental state ... was not relevant."
However, unlike the district court, we are persuaded that the claim is not bare
and conclusorv. and we are also persuaded that there is admissible evidence
supporting the claim. Arellano 's pro se claim is not artfully plell, yet the
assertions listed above do add up to a claim asserting tliat defense counsel
provided deficient performance by ,,dvising him that facts concerning
Arel/ano's metttal state when he killed his wife were irrelevant. Taking the
other factual assertions offered by Arellano as true about the circumstances
leading up to his wife's death, Arellano's mental state was relevant, as Arellano
explained that he was in "a blind rage" after seeing his wife return to the bar
and that his rage was "overwhelming." Indeed, evidence challenging the
premeditation element of first degree murder might lead a Jury to convict of
the lesser charge of second degree murder, LC.§ 18-4003(ll) and (g). and the

11nlawful killing of a human being in the heat of passion is voluntary
manslaughter, not murder, J.C. § J&.4006. Therefore, Arellano's assertions
support a prima facie case of deficient performance by defense counsel when,
as Arellano alleges, counsel insisted that facts concerning Arellano's mental

state when Arellano killed his wife were irrelevant.
Are llano's assertions also set forth a prima facie case of prejudice. Beyond
claiming that he would not have pied guilty and insisted on going to trial,
Arellano asserted that he pled guilty "[a]s a result of counsel refusing to
participate in [his] defense." These assertions compliment the/act that

Arellano entered an Alford plea by which he refused to admit to the elements
of malice aforethought and premeditation-elements that separate voluntary
manslaughter from murder and separate second degree murder from first
degree murder respectively. Taken together, Arellano has presented prima facie
evidence of a reasonable probability that he would not have pied guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial, but for defense counsel's alleged deficient
performance.

Arellano v. State, 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2017 at 4-5 (emphasis added). The highlighted
portions of this Opinion (as set forth above) show that the Idaho Court of Appeals narrowed the
issue to be heard at evidentiary hearing as to the relevancy of Petitioner's mental status upon
killing his wife and whether Jensen properly advised Petitioner of the same.
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Petitioner has now narrowed the issue within the parameters set forth by the Idaho Court
of Appeals because the Petitioner's argument remains that Jensen failed to discuss the relevancy
of Petitioner's mental state in relation to second-degree murder. In fact, the issue of whether
Jensen failed to properly advise Petitioner of the possibility of a second-degree murder
conviction (by discussing the elements and application of the facts of Petitioner's case to the
same) and the potential outcomes of a second-degree murder conviction is directly discussed by
the Idaho Court of Appeals. In the above language, the Idaho Court of Appeals discusses why
discussion of the elements of, application of, and effect of a second-degree murder possibility
was critical to Arellano's representation:

Indeed, evidence challenging the premeditation element o[flrst degree murder
might lead a iurv to convict ofthe lesser charge of second degree murder, I.C. §
J8-4003(a) and (g) ...

These assertions compliment the fact that Arellano entered an Alford plea by
which he refused to admit to the elements of malice aforethought and
premeditation-elements that separate voluntary manslaughter from murder
and separate second degree murder from first degree murder respectively.

Id. Arellano remains within the scope of the issues permitted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, and
his refinement of the issues is entirely appropriate, and the State had notice of the parameters of
the issues when the Idaho Court of Appeals entered its Opinion in this case.

3.

PETITIONER FULFILLED HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING BOTH PRONGS OF
STRICKLAND AT THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING,

The State finally argues that Petitioner "has failed to satisfy the burden of proof for said
claims." Respondent's Brief at 8. Petitioner does not wish to entirely restate the fulsome
analysis as set forth in his Post-Trial Brief, Petitioner does wish to respond to some of the
arguments as raised by the State.
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First, the State argues that Jensen's explanation as to why he did not discuss with
Petitioner the elements and application of the facts of second-degree murder was acceptable.
Respondent's Brie/at 9-10. The State relies on Jensen's testimony that he:

... couldn't get [the prosecutor] to accept anything less than [first degree
murder]. So as far as second degree murder goes, I don't recall if it was ever
in play, other than I guess it could have been a potential lesser included
offense than the first degree murder if the case had gone to trial.
Transcript, P. 101, LL 17-20. (emphasis added). In essence, as is outlined by the State in
Re~pondent 's Brief, Jensen <lid not see any application of second-degree murder because th~

prosecutor in the case didn't make the offer for a plea to an amended second-degree murder
charge. Respondent's Brief at l 0. The State summarizes this assertion in stating, "Seconddegree murder was not even [sic] option for Arellano to consider during plea negotiations, and as
such, it is reasonable for Mr. Jensen to not discuss something with Arellano that is not ever
offered by the State in negotiations." Id. The State finally argues that this argument is bolstered

by the fact that Petitioner entered a guilty plea, and this case never went to trial.
First, this analysis flies entirely in the face of the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in this
matter. Again, the following language of the Idaho Court of Appeals decision comes into play:
Indeed, evidence challenging the premeditation element of first degree murder
might lead a iurv to convict of the lesser charge o(second degree murder, LC.§
18-4003(a) and (g) ...

These assertions compliment the fact that Arellano entered an Alford plea by
which he refused to admit to the elements of malice aforethought and
premeditation-elements that separate volimtary manslaughter from murder
and separate second degree murder from first degree murder respectively.

Arellano v. State, 2015 Opinion No. 30, May 27, 2017 at 4-5 (emphasis added).
This language first entirely contradicts the State's assertion that Jensen did not need to
discuss the elements and application of facts to second degree murder because (as even Jensen
recognized in his testimony), a very real possibility had the case gone to trial would have been a
PETITIONER'S R.EPL Y POST· TRJAL BRIEF· 5
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second-degree murder conviction. Furthermore, the State's assertion that because this case never
went to trial, Jensen's failure to advise Petitioner of second-degree murder, is entirely misplaced.
At the time that Petitioner entered his guilty plea to first-degree murder, he did so without any
knowledge that there was a real possibility of an outcome of trial- and that outcome could have
a significantly reduced sentence.
Finally, on this topic, the idea asserted by the State that because the prosecutor didn't
offer second-degree murder in plea discussions, Jensen didn't need to consider it or discuss it
with Petitioner, is not only without a basis in law but appalling. Jensen - and the State

in

asserting this idea are essentially saying that the State has all power to determine what is or is not
at consideration in a criminal case. It is at the very essence of providing effective assistance of
counsel that a criminal defense attorney should consider - and communicate with his/her client the potential outcomes at trial, even if a prosecutor doesn't consider such an outcome as a
possibility in a plea negotiation.
Second, this cited language above acknowledges that the manner in which Petitioner
entered his guilty plea- with an Alford plea to the mental elements of first~degree murdershow the critical importance of Petitioner understanding the difference between first and seconddegree murder when entering his plea. Petitioner further relies on his argument in this regard as
set forth in the Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief; however, it is worth reiterating that at no time during
the change of plea hearing did anyone ask Arellano any question that would indicate that he
actually understood the elements of malice aforethought or premeditation. See, generally, COP
Transcript at 29, L. 22 through 30. LL 7 and Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief at 11.

PETITIONER'S REPLY POST-TRIAL BRIEF - 6
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing argument fully addresses all of the issues raised by the State in the
Respondent's Brief Petitioner requests that this Court allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty
plea and proceed forward to trial.

DATED this 281h day of April, 2017.
HrLVERDA MCRAE,

PLLC

By:~
Steven R. McRae
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of April, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document upon the following:
Cassia County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 7
Burley. ID 83318
Fax: (208) 878-2924

[ ]

[ J

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail

~Fz:,
[ ]

~~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
On: 5/18/2017 04:25 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,

Case No. CV-2013-390

Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO.
Respondent.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In Cassia County case CR-2010-4251 ("the underlying case"), the Petitioner Juan Manuel
Arellano ('"Mr. Arellano") pled guilty to the offense of murder in the first degree, with an A(ford1
plea to the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation. See I.C. §§ 18-4001, I8-4003(a).
On April 28, 2011, the court sentenced Mr. Arellano to a unified term of imprisonment of life
with twenty-two years determinate and committed him to the custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction tq serve his sentence.
On May 3, 2013, Mr. Arellano filed the petition for post-conviction relief r·Petition") in
this case. The Respondent State of Idaho ("the State") filed a motion for summary disposition.

1 See

North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25. 37. 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171 (1970).
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On February 18, 2014, the court granted the State's motion for summary disposition and entered
a judgment, dismissing the Petition in its entirety.
Mr. Arellano filed an appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the judgment as to one
of the claims in the Petition, affirmed the court's judgment as to all other claims in the Petition,
and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 351 P.3d
636 (Ct.App.2015).
On January 13, 2017, the court conducted a trial on the one claim for post-conviction
relief that remained after the appeal, and the parties were given the opportunity for post-trial
briefing. On April 28. 2017, the court took the matter under advisement.
The court issues the follO\ving findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and Idaho Code§ l 9-4907(a).
FINDINGS OF FACT

The court determines that the facts set forth below were proved by a preponderance of
substantial. material. and competent evidence produced at the trial in this case.
Mr. Arellano and his wife, Ramona Monica Arellano Nanez ("Ms. Nanez"). had a very
tumultuous relationship. On the evening of May 29, 2010. Mr. Arellano sent several text
messages to Crystal Castaneda ("Ms. Castaneda''), a mutual friend of Mr. Arellano and ~ls.
Nanez. One of Mr. Arellano' s text messages read, in reference to Ms. Nanez:

··voi amatar esa

piruja." (Def.'s Ex. A.) A certified interpreter translated this text message from Spanish into
English as follows: '"I'm going to kill that whore." (Def's Ex. B.)
That same evening, Mr. Arellano went to a bar in Burley, Idaho, known as ''El Paralito,"
and he took a handgun with him. He stayed at El Paralito for a period of time before Ms. Nanez
arrived. When Ms. Nanez arrived and went out onto the dance floor with another man, Mr.
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Arellano walked towards her. pointed his handgun at her, and fired a single shot that killed her.
Mr. Arellano was arrested shortly thereafter. During his initial interview with law enforcement
officers, Mr. Arellano admitted that he had planned to kill Ms. Nanez that night.
The State filed multiple charges against Mr. Arellano, including the charge of first degree
murder. 2 Kent Jensen ('"Mr. Jensen") was Mr. Arellano's defense attorney.
In developing a defense to the first degree murder charge, Mr. Jensen focused on the
evidence of Mr. Arellano·s mental state and intent. Prior to receiving discovery from the State,
Mr. Jensen discussed the case with Mr. Arellano, and Mr. Arellano told Mr. Jensen about his
tumultuous relationship with Ms. Nanez. At that time, Mr. Jensen believed that the e'vidence in
the case would not support the malice aforethought and premeditation elements of the offense of
first degree murder. See LC.§§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003. At the trial in this case, Mr. Jensen
testified as follows regarding his initial view of the underlying case and his discussions with Mr.
Arellano:
So it appeared to me that where he's at a bar, [Ms. Nanez] shows up with
another man. he sees that, that falls into that category of voluntary manslaughter,
where in the heat of passion the crime is committed. So that was the discussion
initially with the case and how we proceeded from the point forward.
So I explained to him at that time at that if his emotions were such that if
he saw that and his emotions were inflamed because of what she was doing there,
that he could be justified to the point, not of getting away with the crime and
being absolved. there wouldn't be any - there were no self-defense issues as I
explained to him -- but that he would be able to avoid the charge as it was initially
filed. And if the jury agreed with our version of events and he could bear that out
and show that it was in the heat of passion, then he'd get voluntary manslaughter.
(Hr'gTr.18:9-14, 19:16-20:1 (Jan.13,2017).)

The other charges included aggravated battery, attempted murder, and enhancements on each charge for the use of
a deadly weapon. The aggravated battery charge was based upon the allegation that the bullet that killed Ms. Nanez
exited her body and struck another person standing nearby. The attempted murder charge is based upon the
allegation that Mr. Arellano threatened to kill and attempted to shoot another person at the bar who tried to
intervene.

1
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Later, in discovery, Mr. Jensen received evidence of the text message that Mr. Arellano
sent to Ms. Castaneda approximately three or four hours before killing Ms. Nanez. Mr. Jensen
testified as follows regarding how the text message affected his view of the case:
... after I received that particular bit of evidence I went back and talked to
Mr. Arellano about that, because in my opinion that changed the nature of the
case. Because the texts were sent within hours of this occurring it suddenly
changed the nature of the case from one of heat of passion, to one of intent.
And then that's when I know we had that discussion at length about the
difference of what he was facing, because at that point, you know, you're looking
at -- if you go to trial and you've got a pretty good idea of what voluntary
manslaughter is, you can present that defense to the jury, and in my opinion at
that time the state didn't have any evidence that would indicate otherwise and I
thought we had a pretty good shot at it.
But once that text message showed up that changed the calculus because it
was going to be very hard for us to walk in and argue that he did all of this in the
heat of passion, having just sent this text earlier. So at that juncture I know we had
that discussion about the prospects of going to trial and the difference. \Vhereas
then the intent, premeditated and all that stuff, comes into play and that bolsters
the state's case. We had that discussion, yes.
(Hr'g Tr. 23:23-24:20 (Jan. 13, 2017).)
l\.fr. Jensen explained to Mr. Arellano the effect of the text message on his defense of the

case. Although Mr. Jensen explained to Mr. Arellano the difference between first degree murder
and voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Jensen did not recall if he discussed the difference between first
degree murder and second degree murder. However, he testified that he did not believe that the
distinction between first degree murder and second degree murder was important in the
underlying case:
Whether it was a first degree case, looking at premeditation; second degree case,
looking at the intent issue on a potential lesser standard, it didn't matter to me
under the facts of the circumstances at that point because of that text message.
Because to me that -- you know, it didn't -- maybe the prosecutor wasn't going to
push it into the premeditated range, but it certainly came out of the range of
voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion, because it did show that there was
at least some rudimentary thought process or planning that was going into
committing this crime, looking at it from the State's perspective and advising my
client.
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(Hr'g Tr. 42:2-13 (Jan. 13, 2017).)
The parties eventually negotiated a plea agreement. Before Mr. Arellano entered into the
plea agreement, Mr. Jensen and Mr. Arellano had a conversation about the strength of the State's
evidence that would support the first degree murder charge. Mr. Jensen testified about this
conversation as follows:
The conversation involved looking at the evidence from what would be
established and if we went ahead with the voluntary manslaughter defense. They
would use the text to show that he had designs to carry out this crime, that he'd
thought about it and sent a text message ahead. Mr. Arellano disagreed with that
particular point
We then had a discussion about the plea bargain which was offered to him
and whether that would mitigate -- it wasn't perfect, it was something that was
offered to him, that he could take advantage ot~ If we went to trial of course that
offer would not be on the table.
So I didn't think that we could win a voluntary manslaughter defense, so at
that point we were trying to figure out the best option for Mr. Arellano. I
discussed with him that he could enter a plea. He wouldn't have to acknowledge
that particular element of the crime, we could take advantage of the plea
agreement \vhich had been offered and we could -- as I stated earlier, we could
actually argue for less at sentencing.
(Hr'g Tr. 59:13-60:16 (Jan. 13, 2017).)
Mr. Arellano entered into the plea agreement with the State. As set forth above, Mr.
Arellano pled guilty to the offense of first degree murder, with an A(lord plea to the elements of
malice aforethought and premeditation. At the trial in this case, Mr. Arellano testified that at the
time he entered his plea, he did not have an understanding of those elements. At the change of
plea hearing, the prosecuting attorney, Blaine Cannon ("Mr. Cannon''), summarized the evidence
that the State would present at trial to show the factual basis for the A(ford plea. Mr. Cannon
discussed Mr. Arellano's text message to Ms. Castaneda, Mr. Arellano's admission to law
enforcement officers that he was planning to kill Ms. Nanez that night. and the circumstances
surrounding the events at El Paralito. (See Ex. 104, Tr. on Appeal 27:4-29:21 (Dec. 30, 2010).)
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CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V
In the opinion on appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals characterized the one remaining
post-conviction claim as follows: ..[Mr.] Arellano informed defense counsel about his mental
state when he killed his wife and ... defense counsel informed him that facts concerning his
mental state were irrelevant." Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 711, 351 P.3d 636, 639
(Ct.App.2015).
Following trial, Mr. Arellano now contends that he is redefining the scope of his claim
within the parameters of the appellate opinion. He no longer contends that Mr. Jensen gave him
incorrect advice. 3 Instead. he contends that Mr. Jensen failed to give him advice regarding the
elements of second degree murder, the application of the facts to the elements of second degree
murder, and the impact of a second degree murder conviction. (See Pefr's Post-Trial Br. 2.) He
contends that Mr. Jensen's failure to give this advice was conduct that fell below an objective
standard ofreasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result.
The court will not determine whether Mr. Arellano's new post-trial argument constitutes
an unpleaded claim that requires analysis under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l S(b)(2) or
whether Mr. Arellano has redefined the scope of his claim. The court simply addresses the new
argument that Mr. Arellano raised in his post-trial briefing.
1.

Legal Authority

To obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner ··must prove by a preponderance of evidence
the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." Thomas v. State, 161
Idaho 655, ---, 389 P.3d 200, 202 (Ct.App.2017). ""To prevail on an ineffective assistance of

Since Mr. Arellano did not make any argument or identify any evidence produced at trial to support the allegation
that Mr. Jensen ..informed him that facts concerning his mental state were irrelevant." the court considers this earlier
argument to have been waived.

3

81

Fl~Dl~GS OF FACT AND CONCUJSIONS OF LAW

CV-2013-390

Page 6

counsel claim. the petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency." Blackburn v. State, 161 Idaho 769, ---, 391 P.3d
654, 657(Ct.App.2017) (citing Strickland

i·.

rvashington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,

2064-65 (l 984 )).
Under the deficient performance prong of a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, '·the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Blackburn, 161 Idaho at---, 391 P.3d at 658. "[S]trategic
and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief
under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted
from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of
objective review." State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,500,348 P.3d 1, 115 (2015) (quoting Pratt
r. State, 134 Idaho 581. 58-t. 6 P.3d 831. 834 (::WOO).

Under the prejudice prong of a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claim, where
the petitioner pled guilty in the underlying case, the petitioner must show "that as a result of
counsel's deficient performance 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors. he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Ridgley v. State, 148
Idaho 671. 676,127 P.3d 925, 930 (2010) (quoting Hill r. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct
366, 370 ( 1985)). The petitioner must ''convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Jcanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524,
529, 363 P.3d 365, 370 (2015) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky. 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S.Ct. 1473,
1485 (20 l 0)). To meet this burden, the petitioner must draw a causal connection between the
alleged deficiency and the petitioner's decision to plead guilty. See Ridgley, l 48 Idaho at 677,
227 P.3d at 93 l.
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"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought ... " LC.

§ 18-400 I. Express malice exists "when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to
take away the life of a fellow creature." LC. § 18-4002. Implied malice exists ''when no
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart." Id. "All murder ... which is perpetrated by any kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree." LC.§ 18-4003(a).

2.

Analvsis
A.

Mr. Arellano did not meet his burden of proving deficient performance
under the first prong of Strickland.

In this case, ~fr. Jensen spoke with Mr. Arellano and understood his version of the
events. Mr. Jensen was aware that Mr. Arellano and Ms. Nanez had a tumultuous relationship.
that Mr. Arellano stated he did not know Ms. Nanez would be at El Paralito on the night in
question, that ~fr. Arellano denied that he had intended to kill ~'ls. Nanez. and that Mr. Arellano
\Vas unwilling to admit to the malic'e aforethought and premeditation elements of first degree
murder. However, Mr. Jensen was also aware that the State had evidence to support the malice
aforethought and premeditation elements of first degree murder. The State had Mr. Arellano's
text message and his statements to law enforcement officers regarding his intent to kill Ms.
Nanez. Additionally, the State had evidence that Mr. Arellano took his hand!:,'Un, went to El
Paralito, waited for a period of time, and then approached and shot Ms. Nanez.
Mr. Jensen reviewed. analyzed. and weighed the evidence in the underlying case, and he
discussed it with Mr. Arellano. Even though Mr. Arellano denied that he intended to kill Ms.
Nanez, Mr. Jensen negotiated a plea agreement for Mr. Arellano due to the strength of the State's
evidence. Mr. Arellano chose to plead guilty to first degree murder with an Alford plea as to the
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elements of malice aforethought and premeditation. This plea allowed him to maintain his
position that he lacked the requisite mental intent.
Although Mr. Arellano now contends that Mr. Jensen should have advised him regarding
the offense of second degree murder, Mr. Arellano was not charged with second degree murder.
The State did not express any intention to amend the charge to second degree murder or make a
plea offer for second degree murder. Further, Mr. Jensen correctly perceived that the State had
evidence of premeditation to support the first degree murder charge if the case went to trial.
Mr. Arellano did not cite to any rule, statute, or case law that requires a defense attorney,
m negotiating a plea deal. to give advice to a criminal defendant regarding an uncharged,
included offense. Further, he did not provide any specific evidence, in the form of testimony
from an expert witness or otherwise, to establish that such advice would be required under an
objective standard of reasonableness. The evidence and circumstances in the underlying case do
not give rise to a reasonable inference that Mr. Jensen had an affirmative duty to advise Mr.
Arellano regarding the offense of second degree murder. Therefore, Mr. Arellano did not meet
his burden of proving that Mr. Jensen's performance in this regard fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under the first prong of Strickland.

B.

Mr. Arellano did not meet his burden of proving prejudice under the second
prong of Strickland.

As set forth above, Mr. Arellano contends that if Mr. Jensen had advised him regarding
the elements, application, and impact of a second degree murder conviction, he would not have
pled guilty and he would have insisted on going to trial.
Mr. Arellano did not provide evidence or testify at trial in this case regarding the specific
reasons for his decision to plead guilty to first degree murder. In the absence of such evidence, it
is not possible to evaluate a potential causal connection between Mr. Jensen's failure to advise
84
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Mr. Arellano regarding second degree murder and Mr. Arellano's decision to plead guilty.
However, it is likely that Mr. Arellano pied guilty for the same reasons that many criminal
defendants plead guilty: he was aware of the evidence against him, he recognized the potential
for a conviction on any or all of the charges if the case went to trial, and he wished to take
advantage of the benefits offered in the plea agreement. If these were Mr. Arellano's reasons for
pleading guilty, it is not clear how his lack of information and advice regarding the offense of
second degree murder contributed to his decision to plead guilty.
In post-trial briefing, Mr. Arellano contends that he would have insisted on going to trial
because he did not have the intention to kill l\.fa. Nanez. However. this assertion is not new. The
reason he entered an A/ford plea to the elements of malice aforethought and premeditation was
that he would not admit that he intended to kill Ms. Nanez. Mr. Arellano also contends that he
would have insisted on going to trial because "there is a real potential for an outcome of a
second-degree murder conviction at trial." (Pefr's Post-Trial Br. 13.) However, Mr. Arellano did
not provide sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. Although Mr. Arellano testified that
he did not expect Ms. Nanez to be at El Paralito on the night in question, the State's evidence of
premeditation consisted of Mr. Arellano' s own statements that he intended and planned to kill
Ms. Nanez. as shown in his text message to Ms. Castaneda and in his statements in his initial
interview with law enforcement officers. Therefore. Mr. Arellano' s version of the events does
not persuade the court that there was "'real potential" for a jury to acquit Mr. Arellano on the first
degree murder charge and then convict on the included oftense of second degree murder.

If Mr. Jensen had given Mr. Arellano advice and information regarding second degree
murder. the court is not convinced that a decision to reject the State's plea offer would have been
rational under the circumstances. Such advice would not change the strength of the State's
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evidence against Mr. Arellano or the benefits offered in the plea agreement. The court is not
persuaded that, but for Mr. Jensen's failure to advise Mr. Arellano regarding second degree
murder, there was a reasonable probability that Mr. Arellano would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial. Therefore, Mr. Arellano did not meet his burden of proving
prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, Mr. Arellano' s
application for post-conviction relief is denied.

r--

lt is so ORDERED this/ f' day of:Vtay, 2017.

tvlICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
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Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls ID 83303-1233
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Douglas Gregg Abenroth
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box7
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_lL email: dabenroth@cassiacounty.org

jdenning@magicvalleylegal.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO

On: 5/18/2017 04:24 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

JUAN MA~UEL ARELLANO,

Case No. CV-2013-390

Petitioner,
JUDGMENT

vs.
ST ATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is entered in favor of the Respondent State of Idaho and against the Petitioner
Juan Manuel Arellano. The Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief are dismissed with
prejudice.
,A....

DATED this

_il ~ay of May, 2017.

MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
RIGHT TO APPEAL/LEA VE TO APPEAL IN FOR.MA PAUPERIS
The Right: The court hereby advises the Petitioner of the right to appeal this Judgment
within forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.A.R. 14(a).
In Forma Pauperis: The court further advises the Petitioner of the right of a person who is
unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, meaning the
right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and the right to be
represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the Petitioner.
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Steven Rey McRae
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls ID 83303-1233
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Douglas Gregg Abenroth
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P.O. Box 7
Burley ID 83318
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
On: 6/5/2017 02:58 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
Brian J. Hilverda [ISB No. 7952]
Guy B. Zim.mennan [ISB No. 9675]
HILVERDA MCRAE, PLLC
812 Shoshone Street East
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-004 l
e-mail: smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

TO:

Case No. CV-2013-390

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, DOUGLAS ABENROTH, AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, Juan Manuel Arellano, appeals against the above-

named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law entered on the 181h day of May, 2017, by the Honorable Michael R.. Crabtree.

2.
The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order
described in Paragraph 1 above is an appealable Order under and pursuant to LA.R. l l(aXl).
That the issues on appeal will include the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Judgment, and other issues to be determined at a later date.
3.

NOTICE OF APPEAL CV-2013-390 - I
90

4.
The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's
record, in addition to those automatically included under I.AR. 28:

4.

(a)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which was entered on May 18,
2017.

(b)

Judgment, which was entered on May 18, 2017.

I certify:

(a)
That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the Clerk's record because he is indigent;
(b)

That the Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

he is indigent;
(c)
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20 I.A.R. and the Attorney General of Idaho.
DATED THIS~ day of June, 2017.

?{;j---·
Steven R. McRae
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEALCV-2013-390-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of June, 2017 I served a true and correct copy
of the within foregoing document upon the attorney named below in the manr.er noted:
Douglas G. Abenroth
Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box7
Burleyt ID 83318
Fax: (208) 878-2924

[8]
Email
dnoriyuki@cassiacounty.org

U.S. Mail

Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court
P.0. Box 83 720
Boise, Idaho 83720
Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 83720. Room 210
Boise, Idaho 83720

[8]

U.S. Mail

Office of the State Appellate
Public Defender
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane Ste 100
Boise, Idaho 83 703

[8]

U.S. Mail

Cassia County District Court
1559 Overland Avenue
Burley, ID 83318

£8l
Email
tgunderson@cass:acounty.org

Maureen Newton
Cassia County District Court
I 559 Overland Ave.
Burley, ID 83318

Roxanne Patchell
Cassia County District Court
1559 Overland Ave.
Burley, ID 83318

NOTICE OF APPEAL CV-20 I 3-390 - 3

l&l

E-Mail

modox:@pmt.org

lil
E-Mail
rpatchell@co.twin-falls.id.us
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO

On: 6/5/2017 02:58 PM

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
Brian J. Hilverda [ISB No. 7952]
Guy B. Zimmerman [ISB No. 9675]
HILVERDA MCRAE, PLLC
812 Shoshone Street East
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com

JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRIQ' COURT

Filed

By:£)

Attorneys for PlaintifflAppellant
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.
STATE OF fDAHO,

Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-390

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

)
)

COMES NOW Steven R. McRae, attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellant, and moves the
Court for an Order appointing the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent
the Plaintiff/Appellant, in all matters relating to the Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court.

DATED this 5th day of June, 2017.
HIL VERDA MCRAE, PLLC

B~
"stev.McRae
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) or person(s) named below in the manner noted:
Doug Abenroth
Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia County
P.O. Box 7
Burley, ID 83318
Fax: (208) 878-2924

t&I
E-Mail
dnoriyuki@cassiacountv.org

Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720

U.S. Mail

Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 83720, Room 210
Boise, Idaho 83720

U.S. Mail

Office of the State Appellate
Pub Iic Defender
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite I00
Boise, Idaho 83703

U.S. Mail

Cassia County
Clerk of the District Court
1559 Overland Ave.
Burley, ID 83318
Fax: (208) 878-1010

t&I
E-Mail
tgunderson@cass ia :aunty .org

Maureen Newton
Cassia County District Court
1559 Overland Ave.
Burley, ID 83318

t&l
E-Mail
modox@pmt.org

Roxanne Patchell
Cassia County District Court
1559 Overland Ave.
Burley, ID 83318

IX!
E-Mail
rpatchell@co.twin-falls.id.us
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5111 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
Filed By: T. F ~
On: 6/6/2017 01:20 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
Brian J. Hilverda [ISB No. 7952]
Guy B. Zimmerman [ISB No. 9675]
HILVERDA MCRAE, PLLC
812 Shoshone Street East
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Fa11s, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

c.v
Case No. t;ll-2013-390

NOTICE AND ORDER FOR
APPOINTMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

)

TO: THE OFFICE OF THE IDAHO ST ATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
The Petitioner has requested the aid of counsel in pursuing a direct appeal from the Order
Granting the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal in this District Court.
The Court being satisfied that said Petitioner is a needy person entitled to the services of
the State Appellate Public Defender pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-852 and §19-854 and the
services of the State Appellate Public Defender are available pursuant to Idaho Code §19-863A;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-870, that the State
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the Petitioner in all matters as indicated
herein, or until relieved by this Court's order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Steven R. McRae remain as appointed counsel for the
purpose of filing any motion(s) in the District Court which, if granted, could affect judgment,
order or sentence in the action. Steven R. McRae shall remain as appointed counsel until all
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motions have been decided and the time for appeal of those motions has run.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-963, that the County shall
bear the cost of and produce to the State Appellate Public Defender a copy of the following
within a reasonable time:
1.

The entire Clerk's Record to include all preliminary, pretrial, trial, sentencing and
post-trial motions, minutes, documents, briefs, pleadings or related items which
are regularly kept in the Clerk's file;

2.

All transcripts for all preliminary, pretrial, trial, evidentiary hearing and post-trial
proceedings, conferences, voir dire, motion arguments, or related proceedings
which are recorded by the Court and which have been previously prepared. All
other transcripts to be provided in accordance with timelines set forth by the Idaho
Supreme Court after the Notice of Appeal has been filed;

3.

The pre-sentence investigation report;

4.

All exhibits which can be copied onto an 8 1/2 by 11 inch paper size;

5.

A list of all exhibits which cannot be copied onto an 8 1/2 inch paper size, and

6.

A docket sheet for both Magistrate and District Court documents or proceedings.

If the State Appellate Public Defender's Office discovers during appellate preparation that
an item, within control of the Clerk or Reporter is missing, omitted or not requested and it is
necessary to the appeal, the items shall be produced and the cost shall be paid by the County.
The State Appellate Public Defender's Office is provided the following information by
the Court:
1.

The Defendant's current address is:
Juan M. Arellano #99235
ISCC, Unit J-210B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

DATED this /tlday of June, 2017.
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Boise, Idaho 83720

E-Mail

Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 83720, Room 210
Boise, Idaho 83720

IX]
E-Mail
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
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